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STATEMENT O F TA X P O LIC Y

Introduction
This statement o f tax policy presents the recommendations o f the
American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) for
improving the system o f taxing corporate-source earnings. These
recommendations are based in part on a reconsideration o f the 1975
edition o f Statement o f Tax Policy 3, Elimination o f the Double Tax on
Dividends, which was adopted by the AICPA Tax Division.
Statements o f tax policy are adopted by a two-thirds vote o f the
AICPA's Tax Executive Committee, after having been initially
approved by the Tax Policy and Planning Committee. The statements
represent the AICPA's view on key policy issues. The conclusions
reached in the statements are based on conditions existing at the time
the statements are issued. The AICPA periodically reviews and, if
necessary, reissues or revises outstanding tax policy statements. This
study reflects the econom ic and legislative environment existing on
November 3 0 , 1992, when the statement was prepared; this environ
ment, o f course, can change dramatically in a relatively short time. It
is possible that the statement may, at any given point, no longer repre
sent the AICPA's views. Thus, the reader should check with the
AICPA Tax Division to determine the current status o f this statement.

Historical Background
In 1975, the Tax Division o f the AICPA first studied the issue o f
eliminating the double tax on dividends through integration o f the
corporate and shareholder incom e taxes. At that time, the AICPA
published its findings in Statement o f Tax Policy 3, which recom 
m ended the adoption o f an integration system that em ployed either
the dividends-paid deduction m ethod or the shareholder-credit
method.
Since that time, the econom ic conditions and tax laws in the
United States have changed significantly. The changes have gener
ated renewed interest in examining the feasibility o f integrating the
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corporate and individual tax systems. Relevant changes include the
growth o f international trade and competition, the increased use o f
debt financing, a lowering o f tax rates for both corporations and
individuals, and the inversion o f the individual and corporate income
tax rates.
During that same period, most o f the major trading partners o f
the United States have adopted some form o f integration. In elimi
nating or reducing the double taxation o f corporate earnings, these
countries have sought to reduce the cost o f capital for domestic
investment. By adopting a comparable system, the United States
would similarly seek to increase the incentives for investment in the
US. corporate sector.
The use o f corporate debt financing increased dramatically
during the 1980s. One reason for this increase is the fact that under
the current tax system, the deductibility o f interest expense by corpo
rations encourages the use o f debt financing instead o f equity. The
rise in the issuance o f debt has created greater risks o f financial
instability. Integration would decrease the tax advantages o f using
debt over equity, thereby reducing the use o f debt and fostering more
stable capital structures.
Another difference relates to the changes made to the tax rate
structure for both corporations and individuals. The Tax Reform Act
o f 1986 (1986 TRA) substantially reduced the tax rates for both
corporations and individuals and, for the first time since 1913, the
maximum corporate tax rate became higher than the maximum
individual tax rate. In the past, the higher individual rates encouraged
corporations to retain rather than distribute their profits. Now, the
lower maximum individual tax rate has reduced (but not eliminated)
the bias against corporate distributions.
Several federal governmental attempts to adopt some measure o f
integration have been made since 1975. The concept o f an integration
system was proposed by both the Ford and Carter administrations,
but the idea was never formally included in a legislative bill. Subse
quent proposals were included in the 1984 study Tax Reform fo r Fair
ness, Simplicity and Economic Growth: The Treasury Department
Report to the President (popularly known as Treasury 1) and in the
1985 study The Presidents Tax Proposals to the Congress fo r Fairness,
Growth and Simplicity (Treasury II). These two reports were the
genesis o f the 1986 TRA.
Although the 1986 TRA did not include an integration provision,
it directed the Treasury Department to undertake a study o f different
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approaches to achieving integration. This study, the results o f which
were released in January 1992,1has focused further attention on cor
porate integration.
Because o f the renewed interest in integration and the existence
o f sound policy arguments in favor o f its adoption, the AICPA has
decided to address the issue again.

Discussion
Under the current classical system, the United States imposes
two levels o f tax on corporate earnings. The corporation pays a first
tax on income when it is earned, and the shareholders pay a second
tax when the corporation distributes its earnings. It is generally
agreed that the double tax on corporate earnings results in a number
o f serious economic distortions and raises several tax policy issues:
(1) it reduces the incentive for equity investment in US. corporations
because o f an increased cost o f capital; (2) it favors debt financing
over equity financing by allowing a deduction for interest expense
without permitting a similar deduction for dividends; (3) it misallocates resources between corporate and noncorporate sectors
because investment decisions are likely to be made on the basis o f the
respective tax burdens; (4) it negatively affects capital accumulation
and the savings rate, with a resulting decline in economic growth;
(5) it encourages earnings retention at the corporate level to fund
operations, resulting in the potential misallocation o f resources; (6) it
lacks both horizontal and vertical equity because o f the inequality in
the tax treatment between earnings from different types o f invest
ment and the reduction in the progressivity o f the tax system; and
(7) it increases the use o f tax-avoidance methods to minimize the
effect o f the double tax, resulting in controversies between taxpayers
and the Internal Revenue Service.2
1. The Treasury Department January 1992 report, Integration o f the Individual and
Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income Only Once (hereinafter referred
to as 1992 Treasury Report), recommends the adoption o f a dividend exclusion
method. The report also recommends the long-range consideration o f the Compre
hensive Business Income Tax (CBIT), a more comprehensive integration prototype.
Under CBIT, shareholders and bondholders would exclude dividends and interest
from income; however, neither type o f payment would be deductible by the corpo
ration. For a more detailed description o f CBIT, see appendix A.
2. For a more complete discussion o f the economic distortions resulting from the
current classical tax system, see chapter 1.
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Given the distortions and inequities inherent in the current tax
system, the United States seriously needs to explore the advisability
o f implementing an integrated tax system. Integration would increase
the after-tax amount available for investment and better balance the
use o f equity-versus-debt financing. Integration would also make the
tax system more equitable, and it could be expected to promote
increased efficiencies and growth in the U.S. economy.
The AICPA has analyzed six alternative methods o f integrating
the corporate and individual tax systems.3 Each method has been
evaluated on the basis o f whether it achieves the following five basic
objectives.
1. Does the method lessen the relative tax advantages favoring
investment in the noncorporate sector?
2. Does the method reduce the tax bias in favor o f corporate debt
financing?
3.

Does the method reduce the incentives to retain, rather than
distribute, corporate earnings?

4. Does the method facilitate the interface with foreign tax systems?
5.

Does the method allow for ease o f administration?

Each method was also reviewed to determine whether and how
easily it could be designed to address other issues such as the treat
ment o f foreign investment, tax-exempt shareholders, and corporate
tax preferences.4
This AICPA study primarily considers the three principal alterna
tive methods o f achieving integration; the flow-through method; the
dividends-paid deduction method; and the shareholder-credit
method. The study also describes three variants o f the principal
methods: the repeal o f the corporate tax; the split-rate tax method;
and the dividend-exclusion method.
The shareholder-credit method and the dividends-paid deduc
tion method both provide integration benefits only for distributed
earnings. These methods can be structured to produce substantially
equivalent tax results. The principal difference between the two
methods is that the shareholder-credit method provides tax relief at
the shareholder level, whereas the dividends-paid deduction pro
vides tax relief to the corporation.

3. For a more complete discussion o f the alternative methods, see chapter 4.
4. For a more complete discussion o f these issues, see chapter 2.
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The flow-through method is the purest form o f integration. Under
this method, a single level of tax is imposed on corporate income at
the shareholder level. Therefore, unlike the two other methods, the
flow-through method extends integration benefits to both distributed
and retained earnings.
Advocates for the adoption o f the shareholder-credit method
argue that it is preferable because it achieves a higher level o f com 
pliance with less effort and because it is more flexible in dealing
with the key issues o f the treatment o f foreign and tax-exempt
shareholders and the pass-through o f corporate tax preferences.
Those who favor the dividends-paid deduction method contend
that it is simpler and easier to administer and that it more effectively
deals with the tax bias favoring debt over equity capital. Proponents
o f the flow-through method point out that it is the only method
that achieves complete integration o f both distributed and retained
earnings. However, it is the most difficult o f the three methods
to administer.
All major industrialized countries that have adopted an integra
tion system have opted for some form o f the shareholder-credit
method.5 Therefore, if the shareholder-credit method is adopted, the
United States should benefit from prior international experience.
Also, the adoption o f this method should simplify the interface
between the U .S. system and the other integrated foreign tax systems
and facilitate treaty negotiations with these countries.

Recommendations
Integration should mitigate the economic distortions and inequi
ties inherent in the present classical system. To the extent that it
lowers the cost o f capital, it should increase domestic corporate
investment in the United States. To the extent that it reduces the tax
bias toward debt financing, it should help establish more stable
capital structures. To the extent that it lessens the incentives to retain
earnings, it should foster more efficient decisions regarding the appli
cation o f corporate earnings.
In the interest o f sound tax policy, the AICPA recommends that
the United States adopt a system o f corporate integration. On the

5. For an analysis o f the international experience with integration, see chapter 3.
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basis o f its analysis o f the alternatives available, the AICPA believes
that on balance the shareholder-credit method best achieves the five
basic objectives o f integration described above. The AICPA further
believes that it is the most flexible method for dealing with the key
issues o f foreign investment, tax-exempt shareholders, and the pass
through o f corporate tax preferences. Moreover, administration of the
shareholder-credit method will be no more complicated (it may, in
fact, be less complex) than the other alternative methods.6

6. The AICPA recognizes there are significant economic issues (including the
effect on capital markets and the federal deficit) and significant implementation
issues (including the treatment o f foreign and tax-exempt investors) associated with
the adoption o f a shareholder-credit method. Although these issues are discussed
in chapters 1, 2, and 4, the AICPA takes no specific positions with respect to these
issues in this statement o f tax policy.
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TA X P O LIC Y A N A LYSIS

1
The Need for
Corporate Integration
Introduction and Background
The United States currently employs a classical system o f double
taxation on all corporate earnings, first taxing earnings at the cor
porate level and then taxing shareholders when the corporation
distributes these earnings. An alternative approach used by other
countries integrates the corporate and shareholder tax systems,
thereby eliminating or reducing one level o f tax on corporate earn
ings. Integration can be achieved either by eliminating the tax at the
corporate level or by eliminating the tax at the shareholder level.
The Tax Division o f the American Institute o f Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) first studied the issue o f income tax integration
in 1975 and published its findings and recommendations as State
ment o f Tax Policy 3, Elimination o f the Double Tax on Dividends
(Statement 3). At that time, the AICPA recommended the adoption o f
an integration system that employed either the dividends-paid
deduction method or the shareholder-credit method.
Following publication o f the initial study in 1975, several govern
mental proposals recommended the adoption o f some form o f inte
gration.7 The most notable were Tax Reformfor Fairness, Simplicity

7. The Ford administration proposed an integration method to Congress in July
1975 and again in 1977, when the Treasury Department issued Blueprints fo r Basic
Tax Reform . Neither o f these proposals passed and the idea was dropped until 1978,
when Chairman Al Ullman o f the House Ways and Means Committee authored an
integration proposal (see 124 Congressional Record 2132 [1978] and 124 Congres
sional Record 7978 p.978]).
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and Economic Growth: The Treasury Department Report to the Presi
dent (Treasury I) and The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress fo r
Fairness, Growth and Simplicity (Treasury II). Both reports were the
genesis o f the Tax Reform Act o f 1986 (1986 TRA), although the Act
did not include an integration provision.8
An integration system was not enacted as part o f the 1986 TRA
presumably because o f the substantial loss o f revenue that would
result.9 A basic goal of the 1986 TRA was revenue neutrality; there
fore, any provision that lost revenue had to be offset by a provision that
raised revenue. At a time when Congress was trying to raise federal
revenues to offset the loss created by the reduction o f income tax
rates, many proposals that lost substantial revenue, including corpo
rate integration, were not seriously considered for inclusion in the
final version o f the 1986 TRA.
Some corporate managers have not favored a system o f integra
tion because o f fears that integration would increase the demand for
dividend distributions. If shareholders demanded greater dividend
payments, corporations would find it more difficult to retain earn
ings for financing new investment. Therefore, corporations would be
required to raise additional funds through borrowing or issuing
new equity.
Some segments o f the business community have not embraced
integration because its benefits would vary substantially both among
and within industries.10 For example, industries that distribute a
larger proportion o f their earnings as dividends may benefit more
from integration than those that retain a larger proportion o f their

8. Treasury I and II contained provisions allowing domestic corporations—other
than those subject to special tax rates—a partial deduction for dividends paid to
shareholders. However, the deduction would have been limited to dividends paid
out of fully taxable earnings. This provision permitted corporations to make distri
butions from taxable income first. Also, restrictions would have been placed on
deductions for distributions in redemption o f stock, including partial and complete
liquidations. Treasury I would have allowed a deduction of 50 percent o f all eligible
dividends; this percentage was reduced to 10 percent in Treasury II.
9. Most observers agree that the adoption o f an integration system would produce
a revenue loss. The magnitude o f the loss is debatable. The 1992 Treasury Report
estimates that when fully phased in, integration would reduce annual revenues by
$13 billion to $50 billion or more, depending on the method adopted.
10. Integration has not been widely accepted by the business community in the
past. Recently, however, in a letter to Kenneth Gideon, Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy, dated June 14, 1990, the National Association o f Manufacturers endorsed
the idea o f corporate integration.
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earnings.11 W ithin an industry, studies have suggested, small or
rapidly growing firms may be at a com petitive disadvantage because
they need proportionately greater capital than larger or more mature
corporations.
Since the release o f Statement o f Tax Policy 3 in 1975, the eco
nom ic situation and the tax environment in the United States have
changed significantly. Some o f the major changes include the lower
ing o f tax rates for both corporations and individuals; the inversion o f
rates12 between the corporate and individual tax; the rise in the use
o f debt financing; the increase in federal deficits; the repeal o f the
General Utilities doctrine;13 the increase in the percentage o f equity
investment held by tax-exempt shareholders; and the growth o f
international trade and com petition.14
The enactment o f the 1986 TRA created circumstances more
favorable to the adoption o f a system o f integration. Some tax
commentators15 believe that the flattening o f the corporate and
individual tax rates facilitates the adoption o f integration.16 These
commentators argue that highly progressive individual tax rates that

11. Adoption o f a flow-through method o f integration would eliminate this problem
because income would be taxable to the shareholder when earned, whether
distributed or not. However, unless a corporate tax were paid, shareholders would
pressure corporations to distribute cash at least equal to the resulting share
holder tax.
12. Corporate and individual marginal tax rates were inverted by the 1986 TRA.
Before 1987, the highest individual tax rate was greater than the highest corporate
tax rate. The highest corporate tax rate is currently greater than the highest
individual tax rate.
13. Under the General Utilities doctrine, a taxpayer was able to avoid the second
level o f taxation on certain liquidating distributions and sales o f appreciated
corporate assets.
14. In a speech to the National Tax Association on November 12 , 1990, Deputy Tax
Legislative Counsel Eric Zolt included many o f these factors as the reasons the
Treasury also revisited the idea o f corporate integration.
15. See, for example, Ernest S. Christian, Jr., “Integrating Corporate and Share
holder Taxes,” Tax Notes (September 17, 1990), 1519-1526.
16. Other commentators disagree with this opinion and believe that the 1986 TRA
actually moved toward disintegration instead o f toward the adoption o f an integra
tion method. They believe that the change in the tax law strengthened the double
tax on corporate earnings because (1) the maximum tax rate decreased more for
individuals than for corporations, (2) capital gains became fully taxable, (3) passive
loss rules for individuals were introduced, (4) the General Utilities doctrine was
repealed, and (5) the dividends-paid deduction was reduced from 85 percent to 80
percent. See Larry L. Dildine, “Effects on Industry’’ in Tax Reform and the United
States Economy, ed. Joseph A. Pechman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
1987), 931-942.
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exceed the corporate rate inhibit integration because higher indi
vidual rates are not conducive to large dividend distributions.
Another change that favors the adoption of integration concerns
the elimination o f a highly preferential capital gains tax rate. As a
result o f the Revenue Reconciliation Act o f 1990, the highest
individual tax rate is 31 percent, whereas the maximum capital gains
rate is 28 percent (corporations pay a maximum o f 34 percent on both
types o f income). Therefore, corporations are less likely to be pres
sured by their shareholders to retain earnings in order to enable
shareholders to convert ordinary income (dividends) into capital
gains (gains from the sale or exchange o f the corporations stock).
Corporate income subject to double taxation was increased after
1986 by the repeal o f the General Utilities doctrine, which generally
had enabled liquidating distributions and sales to escape taxation at
the corporate level. Before 1987, liquidating dispositions o f
appreciated property were only taxed once, while ordinary dividends
carried the burden o f a double tax. This unequal treatment
encouraged the corporation to retain earnings and invest them in
appreciating assets before distributing or selling them in the course
o f liquidation. As a result, shareholders received more after-tax
benefits from the corporation. However, since the repeal o f the
General Utilities doctrine, corporations must pay tax on the apprecia
tion in the value o f assets when distributed in liquidation. This
change enhances the case for integration, because now all corporate
earnings, if distributed, are taxed twice.
The globalization o f trade and the effects o f foreign competition
on the US. economy together provide a major impetus for integra
tion. When the AICPA first studied this issue, few countries had
implemented an integrated tax system. Today, most major indus
trialized nations have adopted some form o f integration. These
systems favor domestic over foreign investment, and they provide tax
advantages to resident shareholders that are not available to foreign
shareholders. Moreover, without an integration system, the United
States does not have as strong a bargaining position in treaty
negotiations with countries that have adopted such a system.1
7 It is
17. The United States has been unsuccessful in negotiating any integration benefits
for U.S. shareholders under its tax treaties with Germany and Italy. These countries
implemented integration systems in 1977, and new tax treaties went into effect in
1991 and 1985. In contrast, in its tax treaties with the United Kingdom and France,
the United States has obtained some integration benefits for U.S. shareholders. See
appendix B for further information. Also, see Richard L. Doernberg, “International
Aspects o f Individual and Corporate Tax Integration,” Tax Notes International
(March 16, 1992), 535-544.
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very difficult to convince foreign countries to extend integration
benefits to U.S. shareholders when the United States cannot offer
similar benefits to foreign-country residents who invest in U.S.
corporations.
In addition, the double tax on corporate earnings increases the
cost o f capital,18making investment by foreign taxpayers in the United
States less attractive than investment in countries that have a lower
cost o f capital. Therefore, the adoption o f an integration system can
be expected to improve the competitive position o f the United States
in global financial markets and increase foreign investment in the
United States.19
The deductibility o f interest expense under the current tax sys
tem encourages the use o f debt financing over equity.20 This tax bias
18. Interest rates, the inflation rate, economic depreciation, and taxes levied on
income from the investment are all factors affecting the cost o f capital for a specific
venture. Lower capital costs stimulate economic growth and savings. Several recent
studies show that the cost o f capital in the United States is higher than that o f
several o f its trading partners, thus making it difficult to be competitive. See Charls
E. Walker and Mark A. Bloomfield, “The Case for the Restoration o f a Capital Gains
Tax Differential,” Tax Notes (May 2 2 , 1989), 1019-1029, and Dan Cordiz and James
Srodes, “A Memo to Congress,” Financial World (December 26, 1989), 22-27.
19. There appears to be no empirical evidence to support the conclusion that adop
tion o f an integration system would in fact improve the United States’ competitive
position. Nor can the experiences o f other countries in adopting such a system be
relied upon, because their economies have continued to be affected by many other
business and social factors. However, the economic model used in the 1992 Treasury
Report indicates that integration will have a positive, although possibly a limited,
effect on foreign investment in the United States and on U.S. investment abroad.
20. On a number o f occasions in recent years, Congress has attempted to reduce
the erosion of the corporate tax base by limiting the deduction o f interest expense.
(There are other provisions, not relevant here, that have also put significant restric
tions on interest deductions by individual taxpayers.) Taken as a whole, these
attempts appear to be a piecemeal approach to neutralizing debt-versus-equity
differences.
The enactment o f Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 864(e) by the 1986 TRA
significantly limited interest deductions. This section requires U.S. taxpayers to
allocate and apportion interest expense when determining foreign-source taxable
income. The effect is to reduce the current benefit o f foreign tax credits, thus
increasing the double taxation o f corporate earnings by U.S. and foreign jurisdic
tions and reducing the competitiveness o f U.S. companies in the global economy.
In 1989, several additional amendments to the IRC were made that deferred or
denied the tax benefit o f interest expense. These amendments include IRC Sec
tions 163(e)(5), 163(i), and 163(j), which relate to the deferral or denial o f interest
on certain high-yield original-issue discount debt obligations and certain interest
paid by corporations to related parties.
Other sections that reduce the amount of interest allowed include IRC Section 279
(corporate interest expense incurred to acquire stock or assets in certain circum
stances), IRC Section 246A (interest expense incurred to finance portfolio stock),
and IRC Section 265(a)(2) (interest expense incurred to purchase tax-exempt
obligations).

11

has resulted in the increased use o f borrowing, which has both
eroded the corporate tax base and heightened the risks associated
with financial instability.21 Many bankruptcy-prediction studies have
found that a high debt-to-equity ratio contributes significantly to cor
porate failure.22 Since many forms o f integration would reduce the
relative tax advantages o f debt financing, the use o f debt should
decrease, expanding the corporate tax base and fostering more stable
capital structures.

A Review of the Current System
Three rationales for the current double-tax system have been
offered: first, that the corporation and its owners have separate utility
functions that can be exercised independendy;23 second, that the
corporation is a more efficient producer that creates surplus profits
that should be taxed;24 and third, that a corporate tax is needed to
safeguard the individual income tax.25
The first rationale justifies the imposition o f a two-tier tax on the
grounds that the corporation and all o f its owners have an indepen
dent ability to exercise power over their incomes. This argument,
called the power rationale, relies for its support on horizontal equity
principles26 and the definition o f a taxable unit. According to this
rationale, the corporation and its owners are considered separate eco
nomic units, each o f which has the power to exercise savings and con
sumption decisions over its own income. Since all parties have the
power to make such decisions, each should be taxed.
The second rationale assumes that the corporate structure
produces efficiencies resulting in surplus profits that should be taxed.
This assumption is based on the theory that a corporations manage-

21. See Willard Taylor and Bernard Aidinoff, “Approaches to Debt: Is Integration
the Answer?” Taxes (December 1989), 931-942.
22. See Geraldine Gerardi et al., “Gorporate Integration Puzzles,” National Tax
Journal 43 (September 1990), 307-314.
23. See Rebecca S. Rudnick, “Corporate Tax Integration: Liquidity o f Investment,”
Tax Notes (February 27, 1989), 1107-U23.
24. Ibid.
25. See Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brook
ings Institution, 1987).
26. A system is horizontally equitable if taxpayers with equal incomes pay an equal
amount of tax.
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ment, econom ic size, and access to capital markets enable it to pro
duce profits in excess o f profits available to individual shareholders.
Two levels o f tax should result because corporations can generate
larger amounts o f income.
The possibility that all levels o f taxation on corporate income may
be avoided provides the third rationale. If corporations are not
separately taxed, individual shareholders can avoid the individual
income tax by accumulating income at the corporate level. Imposi
tion o f a separate tax on corporations may provide the best way to
ensure that all income will be taxed at least once.
Although the classical system can be defended, the double taxa
tion o f corporate income produces a number o f serious econom ic dis
tortions and raises several tax policy questions. A discussion o f some
o f the major problems caused by the double taxation under the pres
ent system follows.

Missed Opportunities for the
United States
Currently, the failure o f the United States to adopt tax integration
discourages foreign investment in domestic corporations because the
double taxation o f corporate earnings decreases the return on cor
porate investment. In recent years, the cost o f capital in the United
States has been among the highest in the industrialized world,27
making investment in the United States relatively less attractive than
investment in countries that have a lower cost o f capital.
Additionally, most countries with an integrated system encourage
residents to invest within the country by granting integration benefits
only to investments in domestic corporations. In limiting benefits to
domestic earnings and to resident shareholders, an integration sys
tem may be viewed as protectionist. Foreign investment in domestic
corporations can be encouraged when the benefits o f integration are
extended to foreign shareholders.28
The United States, the only major industrialized nation that has
not adopted integration, may be at a disadvantage in world markets

27. See Walker and Bloomfield, “The Case for the Restoration o f a Capital Gains
Tax Differential,” 1019-1029.
28. See Steven C. Wrappe, “The Protectionist Potential o f the Imputation Form of
Corporate Integration,” Tax Notes (May 7, 1990), 727-731. See also Hugh J. Ault,
“Corporate Integration and Tax Treaties: Where Do We Go From Here?” Tax Notes
International (March 16, 1992), 545-548.
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because o f its higher cost o f capital. By adopting an integration sys
tem, the United States will increase the after-tax return on corporate
capital and, therefore, will be more competitive in attracting foreign
investment.
Without integration, the United States is also at a disadvantage in
treaty negotiations, since this country cannot offer the same benefits
to foreign investors that other countries can extend to US. residents.
Because the United States does not provide comparable credit for
dividends, foreign countries are not as willing to extend their integra
tion benefits to US. investors.

Debt Versus Equity
The current system allows a corporation a deduction for interest
while not permitting a deduction for the payment o f dividends. This
difference in tax treatment between debt and equity can produce a
distortion in a corporation's capitalization, investment, and distribu
tion policies. The reduced after-tax cost o f debt financing encourages
corporations to finance their operations through the use o f debt. This
increased use o f debt requires corporations to meet higher fixed
charges for interest and principal. Therefore, such higher debt-toequity ratios increase the possibility o f financial distress.

M isallocation Between Corporate
and Noncorporate Sectors
A system that levies a double tax on only one source o f income
creates an economic distortion because investment decisions may be
altered on the basis o f the tax burden.29 Some economists suggest
that the amount o f tax liability should be no more than a small
determinant in the decision to invest in certain types o f economic
activity.30 Taxing corporate earnings twice lowers the after-tax return

29. See Gerardi et al., “Corporate Integration Puzzles,” 308. See also Ernest S.
Christian, Jr., “Integrating the Corporate Tax: Methods, Motivations and Effects,” in
Tax Policy Study fo r AEI (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977).
30. Economic investment decisions should be evaluated on the basis o f their merit,
not on the basis o f the tax advantages the investment will produce. When invest
ments are driven primarily by tax consequences, resources are not used efficiently.
See Eugene Steurle, “Effects on Financial Decisionmaking,” in Tax Reform and the
United States Economy, ed. Joseph A. Pechman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Insti
tution, 1987), 55-70.
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to investors. Therefore, the cost o f capital in the corporate sector is
greater than in the noncorporate sector.31
As investors seek to maximize after-tax return on capital, they may
shift their investments from the corporate sector to the noncorporate
sector. This shift may result in a lower return from any given amount
o f capital, thereby decreasing overall economic output. In addition,
the current system discourages capital-intensive investment, since
such activities must be conducted in corporate form because o f the
large financing requirements. Because o f the high cost o f capital,
investors may be inclined to reallocate their funds from capitalintensive industries to industries such as domestic trade and service.32
These investment decisions create a less than optimal situation
because capital is not being utilized to its highest potential.

Negative Effect on Capital Accumulation
Economists stress the importance o f capital accumulation in a
country’s econom ic growth. The double tax on corporate earnings
negatively affects capital accumulation and econom ic growth by
limiting the savings rate.33 The average growth and savings rates in the
United States are lower than in most other industrialized nations.34
This difference may be partly attributable to the present tax system
since the double tax increases the tax burden on corporate income
and thus reduces the rate o f return on investment in the corporate
sector. Studies have shown that lower rates o f return inhibit savings

31. Investors consider all costs o f a particular venture when making investment
decisions. The combination o f all financial and tax costs determines the overall cost
o f capital.
32. The 1986 TRA increased corporate tax burdens more than it increased the tax
burdens on noncorporate businesses. This increase adds to the bias against the use
o f corporations. However, on average, domestic trade and service businesses will
have a direct tax reduction because these industries generally receive more
benefits from the rate reduction than the broadened tax-base costs. Therefore,
many investors may shift to these sectors. See Dildine, “Effects on Industry” in Tax
Refo rm and the United States Economy, 941-942.
33. See Jane G. Gravelle, “Corporate Tax Integration; Issues and Opinions,” CRS
Report fo r Congress (June 14, 1991), 1-57.
34. See Walker and Bloomfield, “The Case for the Restoration o f a Capital Gains
Tax Differential,” 1019-1029.
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and investment.35 Therefore, investors ignore many new and innova
tive ventures because the risks involved exceed the expected return.
This misallocation o f resources distorts investment decisions and
limits econom ic growth.

Earnings Retention at the Corporate Level
Under the present classical system, corporations are encouraged
to retain earnings and thereby avoid a second level o f tax until distri
butions are made. Therefore, corporations have an incentive to fund
operations with retained earnings rather than to issue additional
equity. The retention o f earnings precludes shareholders from mak
ing independent investment decisions about these earnings, which
may result in a misallocation o f resources.
The 1986 TRA reduced the advantages o f corporate earnings
retention by repealing the General Utilities doctrine.36 Nevertheless,
since the double tax on liquidation is still deferred until a future date,
corporations and their shareholders may continue to favor reten
tion o f assets over current distributions because o f the time value
o f money.

Lack of Horizontal Equity
Horizontal equity exists when taxpayers with equal incomes pay
an equal amount o f tax. The 1986 TRA reduced the horizontal

35. See Gerardi et al., “Corporate Integration Puzzles,” 309. See studies that sug
gest that aggregate investment is quite sensitive to tax changes—for example,
Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson, “Tax Policy and Investment Behavior,"
American Economic Review 57 (June 1967), 391-414, and Martin S. Feldstein and
Joonsung Jun, “The Effects o f Tax Rules on Nonresidential Fixed Investment: Some
Preliminary Evidence from the 1980’s,” in The Effects o f Taxation on Capital
Accumulation, ed. M. Feldstein (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1987).
36. The erosion o f the General Utilities doctrine occurred through a series o f legis
lative changes spanning many years. IRC Section 311(d), added by the Tax Reform
Act o f 1969, required corporate-level gain recognition on distributions of
appreciated property in redemption o f stock. Exceptions to this rule included,
among others, distributions in complete termination o f certain 10 percent-orgreater shareholders and distribution o f stock or obligations to pay death taxes
under IRC Section 303. Beginning in 1982, most distributions in partial liquidation
resulted in gain recognition. The 1984 Tax Reform Act repealed the corporate
nonrecognition rule with respect to nonliquidating distributions of appreciated
property. The 1986 TRA completely repealed the General Utilities doctrine by
requiring corporations to recognize gain or loss on sales or distributions made
pursuant to a complete liquidation.
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inequity o f the then-current system.3
7 However, some inequity
remains because the double tax on corporate earnings causes share
holders to effectively pay more tax than do investors in the noncor
porate sector. This double tax also creates an inequality in the tax
treatment between earnings from equity investments and other
sources o f income such as interest and wages.

Lack of Vertical Equity
Vertical equity compares the ability o f each taxpayer to pay taxes
with the actual tax liability o f that taxpayer. This principle is satisfied
when taxpayers with greater financial resources pay a larger portion
o f the aggregate tax burden. Therefore, a progressive tax system
produces a greater level o f vertical equity. Under the current system,
however, the effective tax rate on corporate earnings for a shareholder
in the lower tax brackets increases more rapidly than the rate for a
shareholder in the higher brackets. This effect reduces the progres
sivity o f the tax system, directly conflicting with the objectives o f ver
tical equity.38

Tax Avoidance
Corporate earnings are the only source o f income that bears the
burden o f double taxation. To avoid this inequity, corporations have
37. By eliminating many loopholes and tax advantages and broadening the tax base,
more types o f income are taxed equally, helping to produce horizontal equity.
38. This result produced by the current system is best illustrated by comparing the
effective tax rate imposed on distributed earnings received by a shareholder in the
15 percent tax bracket with that imposed on a shareholder in the 31 percent tax
bracket in both a double-level tax system and an integrated tax system.
Assuming a 34 percent corporate tax rate, a corporation with $1,000 taxable income
pays $340 in income tax. If the remaining $660 is paid to the shareholder as a divi
dend, the 15 percent shareholder pays income taxes on this amount o f $99. This
results in an effective tax rate o f 43.9 percent (corporate tax of $340 plus individual
tax o f $99 divided by pretax corporate income o f $1,000). In comparison, the 31 per
cent tax bracket shareholder pays income taxes o f $205 on the dividend income.
The effective tax rate for this shareholder is 54.5 percent ($340 in corporate tax plus
$205 in individual tax divided by $1,000 corporate taxable income).
To summarize, the higher tax bracket shareholder's effective tax rate on distributed
earnings is only 24.1 percent higher than the comparable rate for the lower tax
bracket shareholder under current law ( [54.5 percent/43.9 percent] —1). In con
trast, under an integrated tax system using the shareholder's tax rate, the higher tax
bracket shareholder’s effective tax rate is 106.7 percent higher than the lower tax
bracket shareholder’s effective tax rate ([31 percent/15 percent] - 1 ) with respect to
distributed earnings.
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devised various ways to pass these earnings out o f the corporation in
a form other than dividends. Although the current system contains
several provisions to prevent corporations from circumventing the
double tax, the enforcement o f these provisions is both costly and
administratively burdensome.

The Objectives of Integration
A system o f integration would lower the cost o f capital and miti
gate many o f the distortions and inequities created by the present
classical system by taxing corporate income only once. There are
several methods or approaches available to relieve the double taxa
tion o f corporate profits.
In evaluating the alternative methods available, the AICPA has
identified five basic objectives that an integrated system should seek
to achieve:
•

A more uniform taxation of income earned in the corporate and
noncorporate sectors

•

A reduction in the tax bias favoring debt financing

•

A reduction o f tax incentives for corporations to retain rather than
distribute their profits

•

An easy interface with foreign integrated tax systems

•

No significant additional complexity for the tax system

Brief Overview of Alternative Methods
This study analyzes the three principal alternative methods o f
implementing an integration system: (1) the flow-through method; (2)
the dividends-paid deduction method; and (3) the shareholder-credit
method. However, three variants o f these principal methods have also
been considered: (1) the repeal o f the corporate tax; (2) the split-rate
corporate-level tax; and (3) the dividend-exclusion method.39

39. The 1992 Treasury Report extensively analyzes four integration prototypes: the
dividend-exclusion method, the flow-through method, the shareholder-credit
method, and the CBIT. The report does not consider the repeal o f the corporate tax
or the split-rate method, and it provides only a brief evaluation o f the dividendspaid deduction method.
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A brief overview o f the three principal alternatives follows. A
more detailed evaluation o f these methods, as well as a discussion o f
the three variants, will follow later in this study.

Flow-Through Method
The flow-through integration method achieves complete integra
tion o f all corporate earnings by allocating all items of income to
shareholders in a manner similar to the allocation o f partnership and
S corporation income under the current system. This method taxes
all income at the shareholder level when earned, whether or not dis
tributed. The flow-through method represents the purest form o f
integration because it subjects all corporate income to only one level
o f tax, at the shareholder rates.

Dividends-Paid Deduction Method
The dividends-paid deduction method allows a corporation to
deduct all or part o f dividends paid from taxable income. Under this
method, the benefits o f integration inure to the corporation, since
shareholders still report dividends received as income. To the extent
that corporations make fully deductible distributions, one level o f tax
at the shareholder's tax rate should result. This method does not
extend integration benefits to retained earnings.

Shareholder-Credit Method
The shareholder-credit method imposes a corporate-level tax on
all earnings, but grants a credit to shareholders for a portion o f the
corporate tax paid that is allocated or imputed to dividends. This
method generally requires shareholders to “gross up” their dividend
income by the amount o f credit allowed. Integration is achieved by
eliminating or reducing the tax on dividends at the shareholder level.
Therefore, the benefits o f integration inure to the shareholder. As
with the dividends-paid deduction method, double-tax relief applies
only to distributed income. Therefore, integration benefits are not
granted to retained income.
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2
Key Issues to Be Considered
Several issues must be addressed regardless o f the method o f
integration adopted, including the treatment o f outbound and
inbound foreign investment, tax-exempt shareholders, and corporate
tax preferences, as well as the problems that will probably be encoun
tered in the transition to an integrated system. This section examines
these and other crucial issues that will need to be considered in
designing an integrated system.

Foreign Investment by United States Residents
A principle o f taxation is that a system should be neutral toward
domestic and foreign investment. Outbound neutrality, sometimes
called capital-export neutrality, exists if domestic and foreign invest
ment by resident shareholders are taxed equally. The present classi
cal system seeks to achieve capital-export neutrality by allowing U.S.
taxpayers a credit against their U.S. taxes for foreign tax paid on
foreign-source income.
Most countries that have adopted an integration system treat for
eign taxes less favorably than domestic taxes, creating a bias against
foreign investment. Additionally, some o f these countries create
another bias against foreign investment by domestic corporations by
levying a compensatory tax40 on distributions from foreign-source

40. A system o f integration can levy a compensatory tax on distributions made out
o f nontaxable income. This tax increases a corporations tax burden and reduces the
benefits of integration. By levying such a tax on foreign-source income or on
income that is tax-exempt because o f corporate tax preferences, the system guaran
tees that at least one level of tax is paid on all income.
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income that are not subject to domestic taxation (even though a tax
has already been paid on this income in the foreign country). By not
allowing foreign tax credits to offset the compensatory tax, this
treatment results in a double tax on foreign-source income while
subjecting domestic-source income to only one level o f taxation.
However, to mitigate this result, these countries generally consider
fully taxed domestic-source income to be distributed first, thereby
imposing a compensatory tax only on distributions in excess o f
fully taxed domestic-source income. In an integrated system, capitalexport neutrality could be achieved by passing the benefit o f foreign
tax credits through to the shareholders. The m ethodology
for achieving this result would vary depending on the integration
method adopted.41

Foreign Shareholders
Inbound or capital-import neutrality exists if domestic invest
ments by both resident and nonresident shareholders receive equal
treatment. When dividends paid to foreign shareholders receive the
same integration benefits as distributions made to domestic share
holders, capital-import neutrality results and the inequality between
foreign and domestic shareholders is eliminated.
Under the current classical system, the United States seeks to
achieve some level o f capital-import neutrality by imposing with
holding taxes on dividends paid to foreign shareholders. For foreign
corporations that conduct business in the United States through a
U.S. branch, the double taxation o f their U.S. profits is achieved
through the imposition o f the branch profits tax enacted by the

1986 TRA.42

41. If foreign and domestic taxes do not receive equal treatment, and if distribu
tions come out o f domestic income first, a corporation with $100 taxable income
would pay a total tax o f $34 (assuming a U.S. tax rate o f 34 percent). Suppose the $34
tax is composed o f $10 in foreign tax and $24 in domestic tax. The $24 domestic tax
results from the $34 statutory amount less a foreign tax credit o f $10 for the taxes
paid to the foreign government. In this situation, a compensatory tax would be paid
if distributions exceeded $46.60, the amount of after-tax domestic taxable income
that would create a tax o f $24 computed at a 34 percent rate ($24/.34 = $70.60;
$70.60 - $24 = $46.60). If foreign and domestic taxes receive equal treatment, a
compensatory tax would result only if distributions exceeded $66, the total after-tax
amount o f taxable income ($100-$34).
42. IRC Section 884.
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The goal o f achieving capital-import neutrality must be weighed
against the costs o f extending integration benefits to foreign share
holders. Many foreign shareholders pay little or no tax in the United
States on dividends from domestic corporations.43 Therefore, exten
sion o f integration benefits to foreign shareholders would allow a
portion o f corporate earnings either to escape taxation in the United
States or to be taxed at a very low rate.44 Presumably, because the
costs (that is, lost revenue) resulting from taxing earnings paid to
foreign shareholders at low rates outweigh the benefits o f neutrality,
countries that have adopted integration generally have not extended
integration benefits to foreign shareholders except by special
reciprocal agreements in their treaties.
Capital-import neutrality would be achieved in an integrated sys
tem by taxing foreign shareholders in the same manner as domestic
shareholders. Under some methods o f integration, this result would
require US. withholding on corporate distributions. The level o f
withholding and the level o f integration benefits granted to foreign
shareholders would be the subject o f treaty negotiations, enhancing
the position o f the United States in obtaining integration benefits for
US. shareholders in other countries.45

Tax-Exempt Shareholders
The mix o f shareholders has changed over the past fifteen years to
the point that pension plans and other tax-exempt organizations hold
a large percentage o f corporate stock.46 Currently, corporate divi
dends and interest received by tax-exempt organizations are not
subject to income tax; however, an exempt organizations share o f
income from publicly traded partnerships that are not treated as

43. Most income earned by foreign residents escapes taxation in the United States
because o f provisions included in tax treaties.
44. This situation would not arise if an exclusion were available at the share
holder level.
45. See Michael J. Graetz, Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways and
Means on the President’s 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals, 95th Cong., 2d
sess., 1978, 6144-6166.
46. An individual taxpayer pays a tax on corporate earnings distributed to pension
plans when the taxpayer receives pension payments. Therefore, special provisions
that distinguish pension plans from other tax-exempt shareholders may need to be
included in an integration system.
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corporations is taxed as unrelated trade or business income. If
integration benefits are extended to tax-exempt shareholders, it could
result in corporate income’s escaping all levels o f income tax; whether
this is a desirable result is a tax policy question beyond the scope o f
this study.
The extension o f corporate integration benefits to tax-exempt
shareholders is a major tax policy issue with significant revenue
implications that must be addressed. At the present time, equity
investments dominate the investment portfolios o f most tax-exempt
organizations.47 It is unclear whether the denial o f integration
benefits to tax-exempt shareholders would cause these organizations
to shift their investments from equity to debt; also, it is not clear
whether this result is desirable.48 One possible solution to this
problem is to tax interest income as unrelated trade or business
income;49 this should significantly reduce the portfolio shifting many
IRC Section 501(c) organizations and pension plans might otherwise
undertake.50 An alternative approach is to make the tax credit or the
withheld amount with respect to dividends refundable to tax-exempt
organizations. Corporate income from both debt and equity would be
tax-exempt, thus eliminating the need to shift portfolio investments.

Tax Preferences
Corporate tax preferences reduce the amount o f corporate
income subject to tax through the allowance o f special exclusions,
deductions, credits, and other provisions not recognized for financial
accounting purposes. Corporate preferences allow corporations to

47. See 1992 Treasury Report, Table 6.1.
48. Denial o f integration benefits to tax-exempt shareholders may cause a portfolio
shift because equity investment becomes less valuable in relation to debt invest
ments. This situation could arise if the rate o f return on equity investment
decreases below that o f debt. One response to integration could be a decrease in
actual dividend payments by corporations, since shareholders would require a
smaller amount o f dividends to have the same after-tax cash flow as under current
law. (This idea contradicts the popular notion discussed earlier that integration
would increase dividend payments.) If corporations do decrease dividend pay
ments, tax-exempt organizations are more likely to shift their portfolios from equity
to debt.
49. IRC Section 512(c)(2).
50. IRC Section 501(c) organizations include most charitable, educational, and
not-for-profit service organizations.
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distribute income to shareholders that has not been taxed at the full
corporate tax rate. In designing an integration system, it must be
determined whether tax preferences should be passed through to the
shareholder or retained at the corporate level. Proponents o f passing
through tax preferences to shareholders advance two arguments;
first, that distributed items o f tax preference should be treated as if
earned by the individual, not the corporation; and second, that a
reduction o f corporate tax on earnings devalues tax preferences. Sup
porters o f the first argument believe that tax preferences should be
passed through to maintain the incentives for which the tax prefer
ences were originally enacted.
Opponents counter that the tax treatment o f corporations and
individuals is not intended to be equal, as current law purposely
distinguishes between corporations and individuals in many areas,
especially tax-incentive provisions. These opponents also argue that
passing corporate preferences through to individuals would create
new inefficiencies and inequities in the tax system, since granting
special deductions or exclusions produces a greater tax benefit to
shareholders in higher tax brackets than to shareholders in lower
brackets.51 In addition, if integration seeks only to eliminate the
corporate-level tax on distributions, then preferences should not
be passed through to shareholders.52 The current system specifi
cally curtails the ability o f corporations to distribute untaxed income
to shareholders tax-free.53 Passing through tax preferences to
shareholders under integration would reverse the effect o f these
provisions.
The second argument in favor o f passing through tax preferences
to shareholders relies on the fact that any reduction in the corporate
tax also reduces the benefits o f tax preferences. Since integration
reduces the tax on corporate earnings, the benefit corporations can
receive from tax preferences is also reduced. Proponents o f this view
argue that the benefit o f these preferences should be passed through
to the shareholders to compensate for the value lost by reducing the
corporate tax. Supporters also contend that by not passing corporate

51. See The Treatment o f Nonbusiness Expenditures: The Form o f the Tax Allow
an ce-D ed u ction or Credit (Washington, D.C.: AICPA, 1990).
52. See Alvin C. Warren, “The Relations and Integration o f Individual and
Corporate Income Taxes,” Harvard Law Review 94, no. 719 (1981), 777-778.
53. The earnings-and-profits rules under IRC Section 312 prohibit earnings that
are not taxed at the corporate level from being passed to shareholders tax-free.
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tax preferences through to shareholders, the system would eliminate
the tax incentives that preferences are meant to provide. However,
opponents o f this view argue that since integration accomplishes the
same goal that corporate tax preferences were originally meant
to achieve (i.e., the lowering o f total corporate tax), the additional
benefits created by passing through tax preferences becom e
unnecessary.
When corporate tax preferences are not passed through to share
holders, most other countries that have adopted an integrated system
levy a compensatory tax. This tax applies to distributions o f prefer
ence items that otherwise would have been tax-free.
The ordering o f distributions must be addressed whether prefer
ences are passed through to shareholders or whether a compensatory
tax is levied on distributed preferences. Possible choices include
stacking preferences last, stacking preferences first, or prorating
distributions between taxable and nontaxable income. Most foreign
integrated systems currently stack preferences last, which means
they treat all distributions as coming from fully taxed income first.
This method seems to be the easiest to administer.
A related issue is the effect integration would have on the alterna
tive minimum tax. Since the current alternative minimum tax relies
largely on restoring preferences to the tax base, policymakers would
need to reevaluate the role o f the alternative minimum tax in an
integrated system. The issues that would need to be addressed and
the actual changes required will likely be quite extensive and are
beyond the scope o f this study.

Retained Earnings
The adoption o f an integrated system raises the issue o f whether
both distributed income and retained earnings should receive the
benefits o f integration. If both receive full integration benefits, no dis
tortion o f either vertical or horizontal equity should occur. This type
o f system should eliminate tax-induced investment decisions and
achieve neutrality concerning the choice o f business entity.54
Under our current system, a shareholder who sells or exchanges
stock recognizes a gain or loss measured by the difference between

54. See appendix B for a comparison of the effect of corporate distribution levels
on effective tax rates under current law and alternative tax integration methods.
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the amount realized in the transaction and the adjusted basis o f the
stock.55 If the amount realized exceeds the basis, a gain is recognized.
This gain reflects both the retained earnings o f the corporation and
the net unrealized appreciation in the value o f the corporations
assets. Recognition o f this gain at the shareholder level results in the
double taxation o f a corporations retained earnings.
The reduction or elimination o f capital gains taxes on corporate
investments would mitigate the second tax on undistributed earnings.56 Another approach would adjust shareholder stock basis by the
amount o f retained earnings allocated to the stock, in a manner simi
lar to the flow-through method.57

Nondividend Distributions
Another issue is whether distributions other than those from cur
rent earnings should be eligible for integration benefits. Under our
current system, ordinary distributions are treated first as being from
current and accumulated earnings, then as a recovery o f capital, and
finally as a gain on the exchange o f the stock.58 Furthermore, the cur
rent system treats liquidating distributions and certain redemption
transactions as the equivalent o f stock sales regardless o f the amount
o f current and accumulated corporate earnings.59
Without equal treatment o f all distributions, corporations would
need to specify the type o f distribution made, and this would require
more complex recordkeeping. If integration benefits were limited to
distributions of current and accumulated earnings, the reverse o f
current tax planning strategies would apply. For example, if regular
dividends received the benefits o f integration and liquidating distribu-

55. IRC Section 1001(1).
56. Many of the countries that have integrated their corporate and individual
income tax systems provide some preferential treatment for capital gains on stock
sales through either basis indexing or reduced effective tax rates.
57. None o f the countries that have adopted the shareholder-credit method allow
for such an allocation. However, the Treasury Department's Blueprintsfo r Basic Tax
Reform and the Carter Commission in Canada in 1966 recommended that such an
allocation be included in a shareholder-credit method o f integration. See U.S.
Department o f the Treasury, Blueprints fo r Basic Tax Reform (1977) and Report o f
the Royal Commission on Taxation (1966).
58. IRC Section 301(c).
59. IRC Sections 302(a) and 331.
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tions did not, some corporations might postpone liquidating until all
earnings and profits were distributed, a move that could result in an
inefficient use o f capital. On the other hand, if distributions in
redemption or liquidation received integration benefits, a bias
against sales o f stock in the open market might occur, causing many
shareholders to hold on to stock that they would rather sell, again
resulting in an inefficient use o f capital.
Capital losses in an integrated system need to be considered. For
example, if a shareholder strips substantial assets from a corporation,
the value o f his or her stock may be reduced below the basis o f the
stock. If dividends are received tax-free under an integrated system,
the subsequent sale o f the stock will produce an artificial tax loss.
The dividend stripping strategy is addressed under our current
system in several ways, including a provision that requires a share
holder receiving an extraordinary dividend to reduce his or her basis
in the underlying stock by the untaxed portion o f a dividend.60
Similarly, an integrated system could require a basis reduction for
shareholders who receive certain distributions subject to integration
benefits. Another approach would simply disallow any deduction for
certain capital losses, an alternative implemented under our current
system in the consolidated return regulations.61

The Level of Integration
If integration benefits were provided only for distributed income,
full integration would allow either a credit for all corporate tax paid
on distributed income or a full deduction for all dividends paid. Par
tial integration allows either a percentage o f tax to be creditable or a
deduction for only part o f the dividends paid. Other countries that
have adopted integration differ in their treatment o f this problem,
with some allowing full credit while others allow only partial benefit.
Adopting partial integration benefits could substantially decrease the
loss o f revenue, but obviously it would not fully accomplish the goals
o f integration.

60. IRC Section 1059.
61. Treasury Regulations, Section 1.1502-20.
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Intercorporate Dividends
Dividends paid to corporate shareholders also require examina
tion, since most o f the rules related to integration consider share
holders to be individual taxpayers. However, a large percentage o f
shareholders includes other corporations, many o f which belong to
affiliated groups that file consolidated tax returns. If, under an
integrated system, the corporate tax is incidental to the individual
income tax, dividends paid to corporate shareholders should receive
the same benefits as dividends paid to individual shareholders.
To tax intercorporate dividend income properly in an integrated
system, the dividends-received deduction allowed to corporations
under the current tax system would need to be modified. For exam
ple, corporate income would not be taxed if the payer corporation
were allowed a deduction for dividends paid, and if the recipient
corporation were allowed a second deduction for the dividends
received. Alternatively, allowing the recipient corporation both a
deduction and a tax credit for the dividends received would also
produce a double-tax benefit.
These problems should arise only with intercorporate dividends
paid outside a consolidated group, since intercorporate dividends
within a consolidated group are eliminated. In this regard, integra
tion concepts should be applied at the consolidated level, with the
consolidated group treated as a single taxpayer.

Impact on State Taxation
In many states, the computation o f a taxpayer’s state taxable
income begins with the taxpayer’s federal taxable income. Therefore,
if an integration method alters the computation o f federal taxable
income, adjustments to the federal amount may be required to
prevent erosion o f the state income tax base. Depending on the
integration method adopted at the federal level, such adjustments
could add significant complexities to state income tax systems.
The adoption o f integration at the state level could result in the
shifting o f tax bases between the states. Such a shift would arise if
corporate income were taxed in the shareholder’s state o f residence,
instead o f in the state where the corporation conducts business. A
change from taxing income at its origin to taxing it at its destination
could substantially alter the tax revenues for a particular state. In
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addition, state integration could result in the loss o f a states ability to
independently tax corporate income generated within its borders.62

Financial Statement Impact
Integration may have a significant effect on corporate financial
earnings, depending on the type o f method adopted. There should be
no effect on the paying corporations financial statements if the
shareholder-credit method is adopted, because it would not change
the tax paid at the corporate level. In addition, retained earnings
would be reduced by the amount o f dividends paid and the taxes
incurred. If the amount o f dividends remains constant, ending
retained earnings should remain the same as under the system
without integration because the corporations actual cash outflow
would not change.
The most important impact the dividends-paid deduction
method would have on a corporations financial statements is the
temporary lack o f comparability between different periods. However,
adequate footnote disclosure can mitigate this lack o f comparability.
Financial statements from periods prior to the adoption o f integra
tion would not be comparable to statements from periods after
adoption, because the dividends-paid deduction method perma
nently reduces the amount o f taxes due by the paying corporation.
Hence, this method increases the amount reported as net income by
the income tax savings received from the deduction o f the amount
distributed. Adoption o f this method would increase retained
earnings by the same amount. For corporations that pay large
amounts o f dividends, this increase could be substantial.
The flow-through method presents the same comparability
problems as the dividends-paid deduction method. Income reported
in financial statements prior to adoption o f integration would not be
comparable to income reported in statements after adoption. The
corporation no longer would have a tax liability, since shareholders
would report all corporate earnings.63 Again, proper footnote dis
closure should mitigate the temporary comparability problem. The

62. Other countries —for example, Germany—generally have not adopted integra
tion below the federal level.
63. A similar comparability problem occurs when a corporation converts from a
C corporation to an S corporation.
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amount o f net income reported on a corporations financial state
ments should increase by the tax savings. Retained earnings should
also increase by the same amount.

Transition
Two major options would need to be considered during transition
to an integrated system: (1) whether to phase in the integration system
or adopt it immediately and (2) whether to extend integration
benefits to pre-enactment equity and/or pre-enactment earnings.
The loss o f revenue caused by integration could be reduced by phas
ing in the system at the cost o f added complexity. Another justifica
tion for a phase-in period would be to reduce the first-year windfall
created by the increase in stock prices that immediate integration
could produce.
Distribution o f pre-enactment earnings may be the most difficult
area to administer. If integration applied only to distributions out of
post-enactment earnings, the system would need to stipulate an
appropriate ordering o f distributions and provide for the main
tenance o f complex records to account for them correctly. Some
countries that have adopted integration levy a compensatory tax on
distributions o f pre-enactment earnings.
If the integration system distinguished between old and new
equity, additional problems could occur because the different issues
o f stock would have different benefits and values. If only new equity
received integration benefits, these shares would be more valuable
than the older shares. Thus, shareholders o f the older stock would be
at a disadvantage in the marketplace. This distinction between old
and new equity also would add complexity to the system, as corpora
tions would be required to keep records o f the percentage o f old and
new equity issued and, in the case o f the shareholder-credit method,
the names o f the shareholders who own the new equity. This detailed
recordkeeping could becom e quite burdensome as additional shares
o f stock were bought and sold.
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3
International Experience
With Integration
Many countries, including most major industrialized nations,
have adopted a system o f integration. Some form of the shareholder
credit appears to have been almost universally adopted, but each
country employs different rules within the shareholder-credit
method to achieve integration. Several countries initially adopted a
split-rate tax system,64 but currently all o f them have either changed
entirely to the shareholder-credit method or employ the split-rate
and shareholder-credit systems simultaneously.65 Countries aban
doned the split-rate system because o f the problems associated with
distributions o f previously taxed income and o f earnings that were
not fully taxed at the corporate level.66 The flow-through method also
came under consideration in Canada and Germany, but because o f

64. A split-rate system normally taxes distributed income at a lower rate than
retained earnings. Both Germany and Japan have used a split-rate system.
65. See appendix C, “Degree o f Reduction o f Economic Double Taxation in
OECD Countries.”
66. See Radler and Edwards, “The Split-Rate o f Corporation Income Tax in
Germany—A Tax Advantage for Foreign Owned Subsidiaries,” Common Market
Report (Chicago: Commerce Clearing House [1963, transfer binder]), 9051.
Reasons cited for changing from the split-rate system in Japan include the need to
eliminate unnecessary complexities and unfairness in distributions o f nontaxable
income that a split-rate system creates.
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the many problems encountered, both countries decided to forgo
adopting such a system.67
It is a truism that the experiences o f other countries in imple
menting their systems should benefit the United States if it decides to
adopt integration. However, because o f cultural and political differ
ences, the results in the United States may vary from those in other
countries. The following discussion examines the integration systems
adopted by Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, France,
Germany, and Australia. The systems have been grouped according to
how they account for tax preferences.68

Pass-Through of Corporate Tax
Preferences to Shareholders
w h en the shareholder-credit method permits the pass-through
o f corporate tax preferences, the credit allowed may be larger than
the total tax paid. Only two o f the countries studied, Canada and
Japan, pass through preferences to shareholders.

Canada
In 1972, Canada adopted its current method o f integration, which
is perhaps the most generous to shareholders. It employs a
shareholder-credit system requiring shareholders to gross up income
by 25 percent o f total dividends received. The method allows the
shareholder a credit o f 16.67 percent against the national tax, with the
remainder o f the gross up being allowed as a credit against provincial
taxes. The credit can be used only to the extent that the shareholder
has current-year tax liability; unused credits are not refundable and
cannot be carried backward or forward.
Because the credit is nonrefundable, the Canadian system does
not extend integration benefits to either tax-exempt or foreign share-

67. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “The Treatment o f Corporate Preference Items
Under an Integrated Tax System: A Comparative Analysis,” Tax Lawyer 44, no. 1,
197-198.
68. This grouping follows a study performed by Avi-Yonah and reported in “The
Treatment o f Corporate Preference Items Under an Integrated Tax System: A Com
parative Analysis.” See appendixes D and E for a comparison of the aforementioned
countries’ methods o f tax integration and their respective combined corporate and
shareholder tax burdens based on different levels o f earnings distributions.
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holders. Foreign taxes paid by domestic corporations are integrated
with the individual tax system, which means the system does not
discriminate against foreign-source income. By adopting a fixed rate
o f credit without levying a compensatory tax, the Canadian system
permits income that has not been fully taxed at the corporate level
because o f corporate tax preferences to be passed through to the
shareholders tax-free.
The level o f integration this system allows depends on the
effective tax rate o f the corporation paying the dividend. In most
cases, only partial integration results, because the national tax plus
the provincial tax exceeds the credit o f 25 percent. However, some
corporations receive full integration, and corporations with an effec
tive tax rate o f less than 20 percent (combined federal and provincial
taxation) receive “super integration” benefits.69 Super integration
occurs because shareholders still receive a credit equal to 25 percent,
even though the corporation pays tax at a lower rate. The Canadian
method is the only system that allows super integration.

Jap an
Japan originally adopted a system o f integration in 1961. Until
April 1 , 1990, it employed a method that included both a shareholder
credit and a split-rate component. Tax reform enacted in 1987 elimi
nated the split-rate component, leaving only the shareholder-credit
system. The current system allows a 10 percent credit to taxpayers
with a total income o f ten million yen or less, while those with income
in excess o f this amount receive a 5 percent credit.70 Shareholders are
not required to gross up income by the allowable credit. The credit
rate differential coupled with the absence o f gross-up results in
corporate incomes being subjected to progressive tax rates. This

69. Super integration occurs if a corporation has an effective tax rate o f less than 20
percent, because the shareholder effectively receives a 25 percent credit. For
example, if the effective tax rate is 20 percent, a corporation with $100 pretax
income is subject to $20 tax and has $80 after-tax income. The shareholder receives
an $80 dividend with a 25 percent credit. This results in a gross-up shareholder
credit o f $20, which compares to the $20 o f tax paid by the corporation. If, instead,
the effective tax rate on a corporation is 15 percent, a corporation with $100 pretax
income is subject to $15 tax and has $85 after-tax income. The shareholder receives
an $85 dividend with a 25 percent credit, which results in a gross-up shareholder
credit o f $21.25. Super integration occurs because the shareholder credit allowed
exceeds the corporate tax paid ($21.25 - $15 = $6.25).
70. Ten million yen is equal to approximately $80,000, as o f July 1992.
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method does not permit the credit to be refunded if it is not used in
the current tax year, and shareholders cannot carry any unused credit
backward or forward.
The Japanese system does not grant integration benefits to either
foreign or tax-exempt shareholders. Generally, the system does not
integrate foreign-source income. Special exceptions to this rule can
be made through bilateral treaty provisions.
The system also permits corporations to pass through the benefits
o f all corporate tax preferences to the shareholders without levying a
compensatory tax. However, this issue is not as critical in Japan as in
other countries, because the Japanese tax code allows only a minimal
number o f corporate preferences. As an additional measure to limit
the benefits derived from the pass-through o f corporate tax prefer
ences, Japan levies a “liquidation tax” on any unrealized appreciation
within the corporation whenever the company liquidates or merges
with another corporation. This tax helps to ensure that the corpora
tion pays at least one level o f tax on income excluded from taxation
because o f tax preferences.

Advance Corporation Tax
One method used to prevent the pass-through o f corporate tax
preferences to shareholders is the advance corporation tax (ACT).
This method has been adopted by only one country, the United King
dom, because o f the many complexities and revenue considerations
involved in implementation.

United Kingdom
Under the United Kingdom’s system, corporations remit an ACT
payment each time they make a dividend distribution.71 Individual
shareholders gross up dividends by the ACT payment and take a
credit against their tax liability for the same amount. The government
refunds any excess ACT to the shareholder. In addition, the payment
o f the ACT partially reduces the payor corporations tax liability for

71. The amount o f the ACT payment equals the distribution multiplied by the basic
rate o f individual tax divided by one minus the basic rate. Currently, the basic rate
is 25 percent. Therefore, the equation for the calculation o f the ACT payment is
D X .25/(1 - .25) = ⅓ D, where D represents the total amount distributed.
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the year in which the dividend is paid. This reduction is restricted to
the portion o f the corporate income tax rate equal to the basic rate o f
individual taxation (currently, the corporate rate is 33 percent and the
basic rate is 25 percent, so 25/33 o f the corporate tax may be offset by
ACT). However, the system does not allow any excess to be refunded
to the corporation. Instead, a corporation can carry excess ACT back
six years to offset its tax liability in those years, and it can carry excess
ACT forward indefinitely to reduce its tax liability in future years.
Corporate shareholders do not receive the benefit o f the credit
because intercorporate dividends are not taxable. Instead, the recipi
ent corporation maintains a record o f this income in a franking
account, and the corporation s share o f the credit passes through to its
individual shareholders on subsequent distribution by the second
corporation, which can reduce its own ACT payments by the ACT
associated with the dividend received. ACT is not levied on distribu
tions from subsidiaries to corporate shareholders holding over 50
percent o f the shares if appropriate elections are filed.
The United Kingdom’s system does not provide integration
benefits to foreign-source income, but it does allow some relief to
foreign-source income through the use o f foreign tax credits. To mini
mize the loss o f these credits, the government determines that
dividends are paid out o f domestic income first.72 Normally, integra
tion benefits are not extended to foreign shareholders, although
exceptions can be made on a treaty-by-treaty basis.73
Unlike most other countries, the United Kingdom grants integra
tion benefits to tax-exempt organizations by allowing a refund o f the
ACT credit to these shareholders. Furthermore, by levying the ACT,
the system disallows the pass-through o f corporate tax preferences to
shareholders, which helps to ensure that nontaxable income cannot

72. See Emil M. Sunley, “International Aspects o f Integration,” Bulletin fo r Interna
tional Fiscal Documentation (1979), 2292-2297.
73. For example, under the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty, a refund of one-half o f the ACT is
made to a U.S. company owning 10 percent or more o f the voting power in the U.K.
company paying the dividend, subject to a 5 percent withholding tax on the sum of
the dividend and the refund o f one-half o f the ACT. Other U.S. shareholders are
entitled to a refund o f the entire ACT, but they are subject to a 15 percent withhold
ing tax on the sum o f the dividend and the ACT refund. To illustrate, for a dividend
o f £75, an ACT o f £25 applies. A 10 percent U.S. corporate shareholder receives the
dividend o f £75 plus an ACT refund of £12.5 less a withholding tax o f £4.375, for a
net cash receipt o f £83.125. Other U.S. shareholders receive the dividend o f £75
plus an ACT refund o f £25 less a withholding tax o f £15, for a net cash receipt o f £85.
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be distributed tax-free. In the United Kingdom, the ACT functions as
a minimum tax ensuring that the system levies at least one level o f tax
on all income.
The United Kingdoms ACT system produces an artificial amount
o f credit because the credit bears no relationship to the amount o f tax
paid by the corporation. Instead, the amount o f the credit relies on
the level o f distributions made by each corporation. Problems also
occur in this system when corporations have net operating losses,
engage in reorganizations, pay intercorporate dividends, or have
foreign-source income.74 These difficulties may account for why this
type o f ACT system has not been adopted by any other country.

Compensatory Tax and Tracking of Income
Tracking income and levying a compensatory tax provides
another method that prevents the pass-through o f corporate tax
preferences to shareholders. The simplicity and accuracy o f this type
o f system varies greatly, depending upon the rules adopted by each
country. Italy, France, and Germany have all adopted some form of
this method.

Italy
Italy adopted a shareholder-credit method o f integration in 1977.
The Italian system achieves full integration by allowing a shareholder
credit o f 56.25 percent on all dividends received from domestic cor
porations. Since shareholders must gross up their dividends by this
amount, they receive a net credit equal to 36 percent, the same as the
full national corporate tax rate.75 The system allows refunds to share
holders for any credit not used in the current year.
74. A more detailed description o f the problems encountered under the United
Kingdom’s version o f ACT can be found in Avi-Yonah, “The Treatment o f Corporate
Preference Items Under an Integrated Tax System: A Comparative Analysis,”
213-214.
75. Assuming that a corporation has $100 o f taxable income, the corporate tax rate
equals 36 percent, and the corporation distributes all after-tax income, distribu
tions o f $64 ($100 - $36) would be made. The shareholder must gross up income
by $36 ($64 X .5625). Therefore, the shareholder reports total income o f $100 ($64
in dividends received plus a $36 gross up). At a 40 percent individual tax rate, the
shareholder pays a tax o f $40 less a credit o f $36. This results in a net tax of $4. The
shareholder would have a net receipt of $60 ($64 dividend less $4 tax). Thus, distri
butions o f corporate income are taxed at the shareholder’s tax rate.
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Italy does not permit integration benefits to be extended to
foreign-source income; instead, corporations are allowed a 60 per
cent deduction for dividends from related foreign corporations, and
other shareholders receive the benefit o f foreign tax credits as a
means o f reducing the excess tax on foreign-source income. The sys
tem also does not extend integration benefits to foreign or tax-exempt
shareholders.
The Italian system prevents the pass-through o f preferences by
requiring corporations to track income. Under this method, corpora
tions must maintain records o f all income and distributions. Divi
dends are considered to be paid out o f fully taxable income first.
Distributions in excess o f fully taxable income are subject to a
compensatory tax.

France
France’s method o f integration, although similar to the Italian
system, is more accurate and, therefore, more complex. The French
system, adopted in 1965, allows a shareholder credit o f 50 percent on
all dividends received by domestic shareholders, who must gross up
dividends by the amount o f the allowable credit.76 This system
produces substantially full integration because it allows credits equal
to 33/34 o f corporate taxes. Shareholders lose the benefit o f credits
not used in the current year, because these credits are not refundable.
France’s territorial system o f taxation allows foreign-source
income to escape taxation, eliminating the need for both allowances
for foreign tax credits and the extension o f integration benefits to
foreign-source income. Generally, foreign shareholders receive no
integration benefits, but exceptions can be made by special provi-

76. Assuming that a corporation has $100 o f taxable income, the corporate tax rate
equals 34 percent, and the corporation distributes all after-tax income, distribu
tions o f $66 ($100 - $34) would be made. The shareholder must gross up income
by $33 ($66 x .5). Therefore, the shareholder reports a total income o f $99 ($66
dividends received plus a $33 gross up). At a 40 percent individual tax rate, the
shareholder pays a tax o f $39.60 less a credit o f $33. This results in a net tax of $6.60.
The shareholder would have a net receipt of $59.40 ($66 dividend less $6.60 tax).
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sions on a treaty-by-treaty basis.77 The system grants integration
benefits to pension plans and tax-exempt organizations that fulfill a
public interest, but excludes all other tax-exempt shareholders.78
The system precludes the pass-through o f corporate tax prefer
ences to shareholders by requiring corporations to track income by
specifying it as either fully taxed or non-fully taxed. A compensatory
tax, equal to the credit attached to the dividend, applies to any
portion o f the distributions made out o f income not fully taxed at the
corporate level. Distributions are deemed to be made from the
current year’s fully taxed income first, then out o f fully taxed income
earned in the past four years, and finally out o f non-fully taxed
income.

G erm any
In 1977, Germany changed from a split-rate system only to an
integration system combining the split-rate and shareholder-credit
methods. The split-rate system levies a 50 percent tax79 on retained
earnings and a 36 percent tax on distributed earnings, whereas the
shareholder credit achieves full integration on distributed earnings
by granting a credit equal to 36 percent o f gross dividends (56.25 per
cent o f net dividends). In return, the shareholder must gross up divi
dends by the same amount. The credit, if not used in the current year,
may then be refunded to domestic taxable shareholders.
The system does not extend the shareholder-credit benefits to
foreign-source income. Instead, a corporation can avoid one level o f
tax on foreign income through the use o f a tax-sparing credit that the

77. For example, under the tax treaty between the United States and France, a U.S.
company owning 10 percent or more o f the voting power in the French company
paying the dividend is entitled to no refund o f avoir fiscal but is subject to a 5 per
cent withholding rate. Other U.S. shareholders are entitled to a refund o f the entire
avoir fiscal but are subject to a 15 percent withholding rate on both the dividend
and the avoir fiscal refund. To illustrate, for a dividend on 1,000 francs, an avoir
fiscal o f 500 francs applies. A 10 percent U.S. corporate shareholder receives the
dividend of 1,000 francs less a withholding tax o f 50 francs for a net cash receipt of
950 francs. Other U.S. shareholders receive the dividend o f 1,000 francs plus the
avoir fiscal refund o f 500 francs less a withholding tax o f 225 francs, for a net cash
receipt o f 1275 francs.
78. See Harry G. Gouervitch, “Corporate Tax Integration: The European Expe
rience,” The Tax Lawyer 31, no. 1 (Fall 1977), 65-112.
79. Since 1990, the system has levied a 50 percent tax on retained earnings. Before
then, retained earnings were taxed at a 56 percent rate.
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government grants for income earned from less developed countries,
through tax treaty, or through the use o f foreign tax credits.80 Neither
foreign shareholders nor tax-exempt organizations receive
shareholder-credit integration benefits. The system precludes the
pass-through o f corporate tax preferences to the shareholder by levy
ing a compensatory tax on all distributions out o f non-fully taxed
income. Germany requires the tracking o f income through the use o f
the most sophisticated system o f its kind, in which corporations
maintain multiple income accounts based on the rate o f tax paid and
the nature o f any tax-exempt income.

Tracking of Income Taxes Paid
The last method employed to prevent the pass-through o f cor
porate tax preferences to shareholders requires the tracking o f
income taxes paid. This method, which has been adopted by Austra
lia, prevents pass-through o f preferences by limiting the allowable
credit to the total amount o f taxes paid.

Australia
Australia adopted a shareholder-credit system of integration in
1987.81 If a corporation pays the full corporate rate o f 39 percent, the
Australian system allows a full shareholder credit for taxes paid by the
corporation. If the corporation pays dividends out o f income not
taxed at the full corporate rate, the Australian system reduces the
allowable credit. Shareholders are required to gross up income by the
amount o f the credit. The system does not permit the credit to be
refunded or to be carried backward or forward. Therefore, share
holders lose the benefit o f the credit if it is not fully used during the
year in which the dividend giving rise to the credit was received.
The Australian system does not grant integration benefits to for
eign tax paid on foreign-source income. However, the system allows
foreign tax credits to the recipient o f the foreign-source income in
respect o f the foreign tax paid. In addition, foreign shareholders
receive integration benefits only to the extent o f any withholding tax

80. See Sunley, “International Aspects o f Integration,” 2295.
81. New Zealand adopted a system o f integration very similar to the Australian
system a year later, in 1988.
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payable on the dividend to the foreign shareholder. With a few excep
tions, integration benefits also are not extended to dividends paid to
tax-exempt organizations.
Australia has benefited from its observations o f other countries’
experiences with corporate tax preferences and has chosen to adopt
a unique method that prevents the pass-through o f preferences.
Under this method, the corporation must maintain a franking system
that keeps track o f the maximum amount o f dividends that can be dis
tributed and still receive the full credit.82 The corporation determines
the percentage o f its income to be franked, and also is responsible for
reporting to the shareholders the proper taxable amount o f dividends
and the available credit. Because the franking system tracks and
accounts for all taxes paid, preventing pass-through o f preferences to
shareholders becomes less difficult. Because o f the varying ratios o f
credit available on distributions, this system becomes significantly
more complex at the shareholder level than a system that levies a
compensatory tax at the corporate level.

82. The corporate tax paid, multiplied by one minus the corporate tax rate, divided
by the corporate tax rate, represents the increase in the franking account. For exam
ple, if a corporation has $100 in income and pays a tax o f $39, the franking account
is increased by $61 ($39 x [(1-.39)/.39]).
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4
Evaluation of Alternative
Integration Methods
The AICPA studied and evaluated six alternative methods o f
integration. Three methods —the flow-through m ethod, the
dividends-paid deduction method, and the shareholder-credit
m ethod—are the most widely recognized alternatives. These
methods will be discussed in detail in this section. Three other
methods o f implementing integration —the repeal o f the corporate
tax, the split-rate corporate-level tax, and the dividend-exclusion
m ethod—were also studied. These methods will be discussed later in
this section.

Flow-Through Method
The flow-through method eliminates the corporate-level income
tax by allocating a corporations income or loss proportionately
among all its shareholders and imposing tax consequences at the
shareholder level. This method results in complete integration o f
both distributed and retained earnings, and has the effect o f treating
a regular C corporation in a manner similar to the way a partnership
or an S corporation is treated under current law.83

83. Simplified rules for reporting the flow-through o f items for large partnerships
have been proposed, first in the Tax Simplification Act o f 1991 and again in the E co
nomic Growth Acceleration Act o f 1992 (H.R. 4210,102d Cong., 2d sess. Sec. 4301
[1992]). These rules attempt to simplify the manner in which large partnerships com 
municate tax information to their partners. If enacted as proposed, these measures
would make the flow-through method more attractive as an integration alternative.
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Fairness
Full integration should eliminate the vertical and horizontal ineq
uities in the current system, because all corporate income items
would be taxed once at the shareholder’s applicable tax rate. Horizon
tal equity should result because the tax rate on corporate income
would be the same as the rate applied to other sources o f income,
whereas the use o f a progressive tax system at the shareholder level
achieves vertical equity.

Debt Versus Equity
Full integration would reduce the tax bias favoring debt financing
over equity financing. Since both corporate earnings and interest
income would be taxed only at the shareholder or creditor level, debt
financing would not have the significant advantages over equity that
it currently enjoys for tax purposes. On the other hand, to the extent
that foreign and tax-exempt shareholders are fully taxed on their
allocated income, debt financing may continue to be favored by
such investors.

Retention of Earnings
Since the flow-through method taxes all income when earned, a
corporation would not have a tax incentive to retain earnings at the
corporate level. In fact, profitable corporations would be faced with
the need to distribute some part o f their earnings to cover share
holder taxes imposed on the allocated income.

Ease of Administration
Full integration appears simple to implement, assuming that all
earnings (ordinary and capital gains) are taxed at the same rate and all
tax preferences are eliminated. Corporate tax preferences add
complexity to the method because each item must be separately
stated and treated correctly. The appearance o f simplicity may be
illusionary because o f the problems that surface under this method
(these will be discussed later). In addition, corporations must main
tain complex records to transmit accurately the required data to
each shareholder.
A large publicly traded company would find it nearly impossible
to report income determined on a daily basis to its numerous share
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holders. Since a shareholder's basis would be increased or decreased
by the allocated corporate income or loss, the calculation o f a share
holder’s basis for gains and losses also would becom e difficult if
income could be properly allocated. Allocating a full year’s income to
the shareholders o f record at either the first or the last day o f the taxa
ble year or at periodic intervals during the taxable year would provide
one solution to this problem.84 In this way, because o f the adjustments
made to basis, the difference between the amount o f income or loss
that should have been allocated to a shareholder and the amount
actually reported on the shareholder’s income tax return would be
approximately offset at the time o f sale o f the shares o f stock. As long
as the ordinary income and capital gains tax rates are approximately
the same, the difference in tax effect should be minimal (but only if
capital losses are fully deductible). The current limitations on capital
losses cause a problem if the shareholder recognizes a loss on the
stock sale.85

International
To ensure that corporate income is subject to at least one level o f
tax, the United States would need to impose a withholding tax on
income earned by foreign shareholders. However, a withholding tax
would require the renegotiation o f most existing tax treaties. The
withholding tax could be reduced or eliminated for foreign share
holders if the shareholder’s country o f residence were to provide
reciprocal treaty benefits to U.S. shareholders. Providing reciprocal
benefits under the flow-through method could be difficult because
this method has not been adopted in any other country.

84. This method o f allocating income could create market distortions at the time
income is reported as taxable. It could also lead to income-shifting strategies unless
special anti-abuse rules were adopted.
85. Under the current system, if the shareholder has no other capital gains, the loss
would be limited to $3,000 per year for individual shareholders and totally dis
allowed for corporate shareholders, possibly causing a significant tax effect for
either type of shareholder.
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Tax-Exem pt O rganizations
Since tax-exempt shareholders do not currently pay tax on their
dividend income, the flow-through method could cause substantial
amounts o f corporate income to escape taxation if income allocated
to tax-exempt shareholders was not taxed. This issue could be
addressed by either requiring corporations to withhold a nonrefundable percentage o f the income allocated to tax-exempt organizations
or taxing the income allocated to tax-exempt shareholders as
unrelated trade or business income. Taxing the allocated income as
unrelated trade or business income would create a distinction
between the taxation o f earnings on equity investment and the taxa
tion o f earnings on debt investment. It is unclear to what extent this
different tax treatment would result in portfolio shifts by tax-exempt
organizations.

Corporate Tax Preferences
A decision would have to be made about whether to pass corpo
rate tax preferences through to shareholders under the flow-through
method. The pass-through o f tax preferences would create added
complexities and would also raise tax policy issues. For example, the
deemed-paid foreign tax credit under IRC Section 902 currently is
allowed only to 10 percent corporate shareholders.

Retained Earnings
The flow-through method extends integration benefits to
retained earnings by increasing the shareholder's basis by the amount
o f the corporations income, both distributed and undistributed.
Thus, the gain on the sale o f stock attributable to retained taxable
income is offset by the basis adjustment.

Intercorporate Dividends
The dividends-received deduction allowed under current law
should be eliminated under this method, since intercorporate
income is taxed only at the final level. Intercorporate earnings would
be passed through and reported in a manner similar to the way
income within tiered partnerships is reported under current law.
Tracking o f all income and tax prepayments (if applicable) would be
required to ensure that corporate income is properly reported. How
ever, tracking income through a tiered corporate structure adds
complexity to the method.
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State Taxation
Under the flow-through method, the computation o f federal tax
able income for corporations need not be affected.8
6 If adopted, a
state method o f integration could result in numerous state filings by
shareholders, which would increase the complexity o f the method.
Shareholders could be taxed in the states in which the corporation
does business, as in the current method o f taxing partnership income
that some states employ. Inconsistencies in integration methods
among states also would increase complexity.
The potential exists for a substantial loss o f revenue under this
method. Several factors must be considered in determining whether
a states tax revenue would increase or decrease if integration were
adopted.87 These factors include the average corporate tax rate
(whether it is higher or lower than the average individual rate), state
and federal taxes (whether they are deductible when computing state
taxable income), the corporate dividend payout rate, and the redistri
bution o f income from corporations to shareholders.

Level of Com pliance
The flow-through method may not have as high a compliance rate
as the shareholder-credit method, because it relies on the share
holders to report all income. This problem could be solved by the
inclusion o f a prepayment mechanism that would require the corpo
ration to pay a tax on all earnings, whether or not distributed.
Shareholders would be allowed a credit for the prepaid tax. This
process would ensure greater compliance, since the corporation, not
the shareholder, would pay the tax.

Changes to Prior Income
Changes made to a corporations taxable income for prior years
(for example, as a result o f an IRS audit or the filing o f an amended
tax return) create another problem under the flow-through method.
A change in corporate income could affect numerous shareholder
income tax returns for prior years. Some o f these shareholders may no

86. The calculation o f taxable income under this method resembles the calculation
for S corporations in which taxable income does not change but the taxpayer is sub
ject to tax.
87. See the discussion o f reallocation o f income on pages 22 and 23.
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longer own shares o f the corporation when the changes are made.
This problem could be solved by requiring the current shareholders
to report any changes in a prior year's income in the current year.
Having current shareholders report income from a prior period in
which they may not have owned any stock may be justifiable, assum
ing the market price o f stock reflects a contingent tax liability for
potential changes in corporate taxable income. Another possible
solution would require the corporation, not the shareholders, to pay
any additional taxes.

Net O perating Losses
Under the flow-through method, there are three alternatives to
deducting net operating losses. The shareholder could (1) be allowed
to deduct losses in full without any limitations, (2) be allowed to
deduct losses limited to the shareholder’s basis in the stock, or (3) not
be allowed to deduct losses at all. If there are no limitations on the
deduction o f corporate losses, numerous issues similar to those that
arose with respect to tax shelters would need to be addressed.

Different Classes of Stock
The increased use o f preferred stock, stock options, and stock
warrants has made the capital structure o f many corporations very
complex. Multiple classes o f stock make the implementation o f the
flow-through method difficult because o f the complexity o f calculat
ing income allocations between classes o f stock. For example, alloca
tion and tracking issues could arise if corporations retained earnings
allocated to common stockholders and subsequently used these
earnings to pay preferred dividends.

Cash Flow
If the corporation retains a substantial amount o f earnings and if
there is no prepayment o f shareholder tax by the corporation or the
prepayment rate is lower than the shareholder’s marginal tax rate, a
shareholder cash flow problem could arise because the flow-through
method taxes all corporate income, whether or not distributed.
Depending on the prepayment rate (if any) and the level o f distribu
tions, shareholders could incur a tax liability in excess o f cash
received from the corporation.
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Taxable Year
As with partnerships and S corporations, when the tax year-end
for the corporation and the shareholder differs, a potential for tax
deferral exists. The system could allow corporations to adopt or retain
fiscal year-ends with certain restrictions, but such a provision would
further complicate the method.

Transition
Since the flow-through method would tax corporate income
when earned, shareholders would not be subject to tax when such
income was distributed. Special provisions may be needed to account
for distributions made out o f earnings accumulated prior to the
enactment o f integration. To ensure that only one level o f tax is paid
on all income, shareholders would be required to adjust the basis o f
their stock by their share o f income, losses, and distributions. This
basis adjustment would be similar to the current adjustments made
by partners and S corporation shareholders.88

A dvantages and D isadvantages
The following are the advantages o f the flow-through method:
•

It permits both distributed income and retained earnings to
receive integration benefits.

•

It achieves horizontal and vertical equity.

•

It reduces the bias between debt and equity.

The following are. its disadvantages:
•

It requires maintenance o f complex records to transmit substan
tial data to shareholders.

•

Its complexity increases when corporate tax preferences are
passed through to shareholders.

•

It presents difficulties in allocating income to owners o f different
classes o f stock and to shares disposed o f during the year.

•

It causes complications when changes are made to prior-year
income amounts.

88.

IRC Sections 705 and 1367.
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•

It creates cash flow problems for shareholders if corporations do
not distribute sufficient amounts to fund their tax liabilities.

•

It raises compliance problems unless the system implements a
withholding mechanism.

Dividends-Paid Deduction Method
The dividends-paid deduction method allows the corporation a
deduction for dividends paid, while taxing shareholders when they
receive distributions. Under this method, the corporation enjoys the
direct benefit from the elimination o f corporate tax on distributed
income. In theory, this method would allow corporations to increase
their dividend payments if they did not totally reinvest the tax
savings.89

Fairness and Debt Versus Equity
To the extent that earnings are distributed, a single tax would
result at the shareholder's progressive tax rates, ensuring horizontal
and vertical equity at the level o f corporate distributions. Since this
method treats dividends virtually the same as it treats interest, it
should substantially eliminate the tax bias toward debt.

Retention of Earnings
Under the dividends-paid deduction method, the corporation
receives the integration benefit directly in the form o f reduced cor
porate tax, which in turn increases funds available for investment
(assuming there is no increase in dividends paid). This corporatelevel tax benefit reduces the tax incentive to retain earnings.

89. Assuming a corporation has a taxable income o f $200 and requires an earnings
retention o f $40, under the current tax system that corporation could make a
dividend distribution of $92.00 ($200 income - $68 tax - $40 retained earnings)
under the current tax system. In contrast, if the corporation could deduct dividend
payments and continue to retain the same amount o f earnings, dividend distribu
tions would equal approximately $140 ($200 income - [$200 income - $140
dividend x 34 percent tax] - $40 retained earnings).
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Ease of Administration
The dividends-paid deduction method is the simplest form o f
integration because its implementation affects only the corporation.
However, without any special provisions, this method would allow
some corporate profits to completely escape taxation, since a deduc
tion is automatically granted for all dividends paid, including those to
foreign residents and tax-exempt organizations. A withholding
mechanism (nonrefundable with respect to dividends paid to foreign
and tax-exempt shareholders) that requires a corporation to withhold
a fixed percentage o f the distributed income would permit this
income to be taxed.90 However, a withholding mechanism would add
significant complexity to the method.

International
Foreign shareholders usually benefit from a substantial reduction
in withholding taxes under U.S. tax treaties. Under the dividendspaid deduction method, these reduced rates would cause corporate
income to be subject to less than a full single level o f tax. To compen
sate for the reduced tax, the United States would have to increase the
withholding rates on dividends. Increasing withholding rates would
require many treaties to be renegotiated.
The dividends-paid deduction method also differs from the
methods adopted by other countries. This difference would compli
cate the ability o f the United States to negotiate reciprocal integration
benefits with other countries.91

90. A withholding mechanism would involve policy considerations relating to
whether tax-exempt organizations should receive full or partial benefits, thus
extending their current advantageous position as compared with taxable entities. In
addition, there would be both policy and treaty considerations relating to whether
foreign shareholders should receive full or partial benefits.
91. For example, if the United States allowed a 100 percent dividends-paid deduc
tion, under many existing tax treaties, a foreign shareholder in a U.S. corporation
could receive a distribution of $100 of pretax corporate income subject to only a $5
withholding tax based on the reduced treaty withholding rate o f 5 percent. Cur
rently, a similar distribution to a foreign shareholder would be subject to a $34
corporate-level tax, plus a $3.30 withholding tax on the net $66 distribution. To
deny this windfall benefit to the foreign shareholder and subject the distribution to
the present overall tax rate, the treaty would need to be renegotiated to provide a
37.3 percent withholding rate on the dividend. At the same time, the United States
would want to maintain the existing reciprocal 5 percent treaty rate on dividends
paid by foreign corporations to U.S. shareholders. The ability o f the United States
to negotiate this result is doubtful.
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Tax-Exempt O rganizations
Absent special treatment for dividends paid to tax-exempt share
holders, a portion o f a corporation s earnings would not be subject to
any income tax. If this is not the desired result, dividends paid to
tax-exempt shareholders could be treated as unrelated trade or
business income or a withholding mechanism could be imple
mented. Either approach would complicate the administration o f the
method. If withholding is adopted, the amount o f tax withheld that is
attributable to tax-exempt shareholders would have to be treated as a
nonrefundable credit. It is not clear to what extent this would cause
a portfolio shift from equity to debt.

Corporate Tax Preferences
If a full dividend deduction were allowed against corporate
income, as reduced by preferences, this method would be relatively
simple to administer. However, if corporate tax preferences were
passed through to shareholders, the amount o f the distributions
attributable to preference items would have to be excluded from the
shareholder's income. Alternatively, taxing shareholders on the full
amount o f all distributions would limit the pass-through o f prefer
ences. If corporate tax preferences are not allowed to be passed
through to shareholders, the corporation loses some of the benefit o f
the integration system because earnings must be retained by the cor
poration to maximize the use o f preferences.

Retained Earnings
The dividends-paid deduction method is designed to provide
integration benefits only with respect to distributed income. How
ever, the method could be modified to extend benefits to retained
earnings by allowing shareholders to adjust the basis o f their stock by
the amount o f retained earnings allocated to the stock, in a manner
similar to the flow-through method. This alternative would add sig
nificant complexity to implementation o f the method and could be
impracticable if it also required shareholders to report in income the
retained earnings allocated to their stock.

Intercorporate Dividends
If corporations are allowed a full deduction for dividends paid,
corporate shareholders should not be allowed a deduction for divi
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dends received. Therefore, the dividends-received deduction would
need to be eliminated to avoid duplicate deductions by both the
payor and the payee o f intercorporate dividends.

State Taxation
Federal adoption o f the dividends-paid deduction method need
not significantly affect state tax administration. States that wish to
adopt a method o f integration could use federal taxable income.
However, employing this method at the state level would generally
redirect the incidence o f tax from the state o f corporate business
activity to the state o f shareholder residence. On the other hand, if
states did not adopt integration, the computation o f state taxable
income would need to be adjusted for the amount o f the federal
dividends-paid deduction.

Level of Com pliance
Unless the dividends-paid deduction method included a with
holding mechanism coupled with a shareholder credit, the risk o f
noncompliance would be greater with this method than with other
methods. If withholding were required, corporations would deduct
and then remit to the government a fixed percentage o f all dividends
before distributing the remainder to the shareholders. Although the
level o f compliance would increase with a withholding mechanism,
the added complexity and administrative recordkeeping require
ments would reduce or eliminate the major advantage o f this method.

Changes to Prior Income
Any changes in a corporations prior years’ tax liability (for exam
ple, by IRS audit or amended tax returns) should present less o f a
problem under this method. Since the corporation enjoys all the
benefits o f integration, any changes made affect only one taxpayer.
Furthermore, because changes to income do not normally affect
distributions, the deduction allowed to the corporation should not
be altered.

Transition
In the transition to a dividends-paid deduction method, several
issues would need to be considered. These issues include whether
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integration benefits would apply to existing equity investments, to
preenactment earnings, or to both. Limiting integration to post
enactment equity or earnings would add additional complexity to the
operation o f this method.

A dvantages and D isadvantages
The following are the advantages o f the dividends-paid deduc
tion method:
It allows for ease in administration.
It achieves both horizontal and vertical equity at the shareholder
level.
It reduces or eliminates the inequity between debt and equity.
It increases after-tax cash flow to the corporation.
The following are its disadvantages:
It grants relief only to distributed earnings.
It grants all tax benefits at the corporate level.
It grants the full benefit o f integration with respect to distribu
tions on stock regardless o f the tax status o f shareholders.
It becomes more complicated to administer if the system limits
corporate tax preferences.
It does not easily interface with foreign integration systems.
It requires many current foreign tax treaties to be renegotiated.

Shareholder-Credit Method
The shareholder-credit method achieves integration by allowing
shareholders a credit against the tax imposed on dividend income.
Under this method, the corporation would continue to pay tax on its
earnings. Shareholders would gross up their incomes by the amount
o f tax paid by the corporation that is attributable to distributed earn
ings. Shareholders would receive a credit for their portion o f the tax
allocated to dividends.
The tax relief would be entirely at the shareholder level. Theo
retically, this relief would allow corporations to decrease dividend
payouts, because shareholders would require fewer actual cash
dividends to receive the same after-tax benefits. On the other hand,
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shareholders might put additional pressure on corporations to main
tain their dividend distribution levels so that they could receive a
larger benefit from the credit.

Fairness
The shareholder-credit method achieves horizontal equity by tax
ing distributed income only once, at the shareholder tax rates. If the
method allowed the credit to be taken against tax imposed on other
income or to be refunded, vertical equity also would result because
all distributed income would be taxed at the progressive individual
tax rates.

Debt Versus Equity
For investors who are subject to income tax, equity should
becom e relatively more attractive because o f the tax credit that
accompanies dividend income. For these shareholders, therefore, this
method should reduce the existing bias in favor o f debt investment.
However, corporations may still prefer debt financing because o f its
favored tax treatment at the corporate level.

Retention of Earnings
The availability o f a credit to offset all or a part o f the shareholderlevel tax on corporate distributions would reduce the tax incentive for
retaining earnings at the corporate level.

Ease of Administration
A shareholder-credit system would be relatively easy to
administer if a fixed-rate credit were used.92 However, if the credit
was based on the effective tax rate o f each separate corporation, it
would be more complicated to administer. Moreover, the method

92. The 1992 Treasury Report does not recommend adoption o f the shareholdercredit method, primarily on the grounds o f its presumed complexity, even though
the report acknowledges that the credit method is the most flexible in terms o f
responding to such important policy issues as the treatment o f tax preferences, taxexempt investors, and foreign shareholders. The report concludes that the principal
complexity o f the credit method is that it requires an entirely new regime for taxing
corporate distributions, wherein shareholders would be required to apply credits in
determining their tax liabilities.
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would be further complicated if special rules were included for for
eign shareholders, tax-exempt entities, and tax preferences.93
The disposition o f stock during the year would not cause prob
lems, since the credit would be claimed by the shareholder who
received the dividend. If the shareholder credit did not change the
shareholder s basis in the investment, the gain or loss on the sale of
stock would be calculated in the same manner as under the current
system.9
4

International
The ability o f the shareholder-credit system to differentiate
among special shareholders is one o f the major advantages o f this
method. For example, foreign taxpayers could receive the share
holder credit if the shareholder s country o f residence were to make
reciprocal treaty concessions. Most foreign countries have adopted a
shareholder-credit method. Therefore, the adoption o f a similar
method by the United States should simplify the interface between
the U.S. and foreign systems, facilitating the granting o f reciprocal
integration benefits.
In the case o f foreign-source income earned by domestic corpora
tions, a decision would have to be made about whether to pass the
benefit o f foreign tax credits through to shareholders. If the benefit of
foreign tax credits were passed through to shareholders, the system
would becom e more difficult to administer and would incur a greater
revenue loss.

Tax-Exempt O rganizations
Special treatment o f tax-exempt shareholders would be easier to
address under the shareholder-credit system. If it was determined
that an advantage was to be given to tax-exempt shareholders, the
credit would need to be fully or partially refundable. On the other
hand, because the credit would be nonrefundable and not available

93. The 1992 Treasury Report preferred the dividend-exclusion method to any
form o f the shareholder-credit method because o f simplification concerns.
94. Taylor and Aidinoff, in “Approaches to Debt: Is Integration the Answer?,”
suggest that basis adjustments similar to those made for partnerships and S
corporations may be appropriate. However, they acknowledge that such adjust
ments may be too complex for publicly held corporations.
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for offset against unrelated trade or business income tax, at least one
level o f tax would be imposed on all corporate income.

Corporate Tax Preferences
Although the possibility o f complexity does exist in this system,
the shareholder credit should allow flexibility in addressing the issue
o f corporate tax preferences.95 Tax preferences could be passed
through to the shareholders by means o f a fixed rate o f credit on all
dividends. However, if the pass-through o f preferences was not
desired, a compensatory tax could be levied at the corporate level and
a fixed rate o f credit could be maintained for the shareholders. Alter
natively, the corporation s effective tax rate as it varies from year to
year could be used as the rate o f credit, but this would add significant
complexity to tax planning at the shareholder level because the share
holder would need to be informed of the amount o f credit associated
with each distribution.

Retained Earnings
The shareholder-credit method is designed to provide integration
benefits for distributed income. However, the method could be modi
fied to extend benefits to retained earnings. One approach would
couple the adoption o f the method with the elimination o f the tax on
stock sales. This alternative, however, would also grant integration
benefits to unrealized corporate income. Another approach would
adjust shareholder stock basis by the amount o f retained earnings
allocated to the stock in a manner similar to the flow-through
method. This alternative would extend the benefits only to retained
earnings; however, it also would add significant complexity to the
implementation o f this method.

Intercorporate Dividends
If the dividends-received deduction were not repealed, corpora
tions would receive a double benefit, being allowed both a deduction
and a credit for the dividends received. To avoid this double benefit,

95. This method is more flexible because it could be designed to select which
corporate tax preferences would be passed through to the shareholder. As in the
Australian system, not all tax preferences need to receive integration benefits
each year.
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corporate shareholders entitled to the shareholder credit should not
be entitled to a dividends-received deduction.

State Taxation
Federal adoption o f a shareholder-credit method should not
affect state corporate tax administration, because the corporate taxa
ble income base does not change. However, if states did not adopt
integration, adjustments would be needed to eliminate the gross-up
o f the credit at the shareholder level. Complexities or loss o f revenue
could arise under the shareholder-credit method if states do adopt
integration.

Level of Com pliance
A shareholder-credit system would probably enjoy a high level o f
taxpayer compliance because the shareholder must report the divi
dend income before the credit can be claimed. Therefore, share
holders would have an incentive to report income, particularly if the
credit could be offset against taxes on other income or is refundable.

Changes to Prior Income
Adjustment made to a corporations prior-year tax liability (for
example, because o f an IRS audit or the filing o f an amended tax
return) should not cause problems if there is a fixed rate o f credit.
Since changes in a prior year's tax liability will not change the fixed
rate, the credit should not be affected. However, if the method
computes the credit on the basis o f each corporations effective tax
rate, and if corporate adjustments were to change the effective tax
rate, difficulties could arise, since a corresponding change in the
credit rate would occur. The change in the credit would require
recomputation in the tax liability o f all the corporation s shareholders,
a process that could be overwhelming to administer. Most other
countries that have adopted a shareholder-credit system o f integra
tion have avoided this problem by using a flat rate for the credit.

Transition
Several transitional issues would need to be considered in adopt
ing a shareholder-credit method. These issues include whether
credits would be imputed to existing equity investments and whether
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credits would be granted for distributions o f pre-enactment earnings.
Limiting credits only to holders o f newly issued equity or to distribu
tions only from post-enactment earnings would add complexities to
the implementation o f the method.

A dvantages and D isadvantages
The following are the advantages o f the shareholder-credit
method:
It allows for easy implementation when a fixed credit rate is used.
It interfaces easily with systems in other countries.
Its administration benefits from international experience.
It adapts easily and is more flexible than other methods.
It simplifies denial o f benefits to special categories o f share
holders.
It ensures a high level o f compliance.
It provides integration benefits at the shareholder level.
It creates no problems when a prior year’s tax liability is adjusted,
if a fixed credit rate is used.
The following are its disadvantages:
•

It introduces complexities when a credit rate other than a fixed
rate is used.

•

It does not pass through corporate tax preferences if the credit
rate equals the corporations effective tax rate.

Other Methods
Three other methods that have been studied are the repeal of
corporate tax, the split-rate corporate-level tax, and the dividendexclusion method. These three methods are variations o f the
flow-through, dividends-paid deduction, and shareholder-credit
methods, respectively. As discussed below, careful consideration of
these three methods reveals that they are not as effective or flexible
as their principal counterparts in implementing integration o f the
corporate and individual tax systems. Therefore, the AICPA does not
recommend that any o f these methods o f integration be adopted.

59

Repeal of the Corporate Tax
Integration can be achieved by repealing the corporate income
tax but continuing to tax shareholders on distributions o f corporate
earnings. Repealing the corporate tax would produce results similar
to the flow-through method in that the tax burden would be borne
entirely at the shareholder level. The principal difference, however, is
that the repeal of the corporate tax would require that shareholders
report income only when corporate earnings are distributed. Under
the flow-through method, corporate earnings would be taxed cur
rently at the shareholder level whether or not distributed.
Although repealing the corporate tax would greatly simplify the
tax system, it also would encourage corporations to accumulate
earnings, leading to some o f the same disadvantages and complex
anti-abuse provisions that exist in the current system, such as the
accumulated earnings tax and the personal holding company tax.

Split-Rate Corporate-Level Tax
A split-rate tax method o f integration would allow corporations to
pay a lower rate o f tax on distributed income than on earnings
retained at the corporate level. This method has virtually the same
characteristics as a dividends-paid deduction method; however, it
would provide only a partial benefit for the amount o f dividends paid.
A split-rate tax would not entirely eliminate the distinction
between debt and equity, because the system would not treat the
deduction for interest expense the same as dividend payments. How
ever, the differences between debt and equity could be narrowed.
Because distributed earnings would receive preferential tax treat
ment, corporations might be pressured to make larger distributions.
Tax-exempt and foreign shareholders would receive no special
benefits under this system. The same complexities that would arise
under the dividends-paid deduction method for both foreign tax
credits and other corporate tax preferences also would arise under
this method. Because o f the problems noted above, implementation
o f such a method may not be advisable.

Dividend-Exclusion Method
The dividend-exclusion method would eliminate the double tax
on distributed corporate income by allowing shareholders to exclude
dividends from income. Income at the corporation level, however,
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would continue to be fully taxed. This method would produce results
similar to a shareholder-credit method that neither allows refundable
credits nor imposes a compensatory tax.
To limit tax-free dividend treatment to distributions paid out o f
income that is fully taxed at the corporate level, the corporation
would be required to track such income. Only dividends that were
paid out o f fully taxed income would qualify for the exclusion at the
shareholder level. This tracking of fully taxed income would be simi
lar to the tracking mechanism required under a shareholder-credit
method that limits the credit to taxes actually paid at the corporate
level.
By taxing income fully at the corporate level, the dividendexclusion method would achieve the same results with respect to
tax-exempt and foreign shareholders and the pass-through o f
corporate tax preferences as a shareholder-credit method that
allowed a nonrefundable credit based on the corporations effective
tax rate. Also, like the shareholder-credit method, the dividendexclusion method would not extend integration benefits to retained
earnings unless special provisions were adopted.
Although the dividend-exclusion method and the shareholdercredit method would produce substantially equivalent results, the
credit method was found to be preferable for several reasons. First,
the credit method would achieve horizontal and vertical equity
because corporate income would be taxed at the shareholder's tax
rate, whereas the dividend-exclusion method would tax income at the
corporations tax rate, and therefore would not achieve one o f the
basic objectives o f integration (i.e., uniform taxation o f income
earned in the corporate and noncorporate sectors). Moreover, the
dividend-exclusion method would discriminate against low-bracket
shareholders, who would be taxed on distributed corporate profits at
the same effective rate (zero percent) as high-bracket taxpayers.96
Currently, the lack o f horizontal and vertical equity under a
dividend-exclusion method is less significant because the present

96. T h e 1992 Treasury R ep ort suggests that i f policym a kers desire to tax dis
trib uted co rp o ra te in co m e at sh areh older rates, th e d iv id en d -ex clu sion m e th o d
c o u ld b e stru ctu red to allow a tax cred it that w ou ld refu n d all o r part o f th e excess
tax c o lle c te d o n corp ora te in co m e distribu ted to low -b ra ck et shareholders. This
solution w o u ld seem to b e tantam ount to th e a d op tion o f a sh areh older cred it. See
R ich ard G o o d e , “ Integration o f C orp ora te and Individu al Taxes: A Treasury
Report,” Tax Notes (M arch 30, 1992), 1668.
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corporate and highest individual tax rates are approximately equal.
However, these rate structures could be changed by future legisla
tion. In such an event, the adoption o f the shareholder-credit method
would allow corporate profits to be taxed at the same rate as profits
earned in the noncorporate sector.
A second advantage o f the shareholder-credit method is that it
would more easily interface with the many integrated foreign tax
systems that have adopted the credit method. This comparability
between a U.S. integrated system and foreign integrated systems
would facilitate treaty negotiations on obtaining reciprocal integra
tion benefits for U.S. shareholders.
Finally, the shareholder-credit method should be no more com 
plicated to implement and administer than a dividend-exclusion
method.97 In fact, if the shareholder-credit method were to employ
either a flat-rate credit or a compensatory tax, it might be less compli
cated to administer than the dividend-exclusion method.

97. T h e 1992 Treasury R ep ort advocates th e a d op tion o f th e d iv id en d -ex clu sion
m e th o d rather than th e sh a reh old er-cred it m e th o d b e ca u s e o f its sim plicity and
ease o f adm inistration. H ow ever, in its report, the Treasury com p a res th e d iv id en d exclu sion m e th o d w ith th e cred it m e th o d a d op ted by N ew Z eala n d in 1988. T h e
N e w Z ea la n d m e th o d is arguably th e m ost c o m p lica te d form o f th e cred it m eth od .
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5
Conclusions and
Recommendations
Each o f the three principal methods has been evaluated to deter
mine whether it achieves five basic objectives for an integrated sys
tem and whether and how easily it can be designed to handle certain
key issues. Each o f these principal methods would achieve more neu
tral taxation by (1) providing more uniform taxation o f income
between the corporate and noncorporate sectors; (2) reducing the tax
bias favoring debt investment; and (3) reducing the incentives to
retain rather than distribute earnings. Accordingly, the AICPA
believes that an integration method must be chosen primarily on the
basis o f its ease o f administration, its compatibility with foreign
integrated systems, and its flexibility in addressing the key issues o f
tax preferences, tax-exempt investors, and international transactions.
Theoretically, the flow-through method is the purest form o f
integration; however, it would be considerably more difficult to
administer and implement. Broadening the eligibility o f the S corpo
ration election by expanding the number o f allowable shareholders
would offer one alternative to the use o f the flow-through method,
but the use o f the S corporation rules would not be practical for large,
widely held corporations.98 Moreover, if policymakers were to decide

98. While the existing flow-through integration method now applicable to S corpo
rations may deal appropriately with the greatest number o f corporations, it is not
practicable for larger, publicly held corporations. Although expansion o f S corpora
tion eligibility would be beneficial, another integration method must be adopted
for large corporations if the benefits o f integration are to be extended to that sector
o f the American economy.
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not to extend integration benefits to tax-exempt and foreign share
holders, the flow-through method would need to include an
appropriate withholding mechanism, further complicating imple
mentation o f the method. After careful review, the flow-through
method was not chosen as a viable option because o f the numerous
problems in administering the method, its lack o f flexibility in dealing
with the key issues, and its incompatibility with foreign integrated
systems.
Both o f the other two alternatives, the dividends-paid deduction
and the shareholder-credit methods, would offer a more practical and
realistic means o f achieving integration. The publics perception o f
the equity o f each method may be an important factor in determining
whether either is adopted. The public may perceive that the
dividends-paid deduction method would confer all o f the benefits on
the corporation. The shareholder-credit method is likely to be more
acceptable, since the public may perceive that the shareholder would
receive a greater benefit than under the current system or the
dividends-paid deduction method. On the other hand, the public
may perceive that integration benefits only high-income taxpayers.
The United States could adopt either the deduction or the credit
method with substantially the same tax results.99 However, to achieve
this equality, it must be assumed that the corporate-dividend policy
would be comparable under both methods. In addition, the deduc
tion method would be assumed to include a withholding mechanism
and credits under both methods would be refundable.

99. F or exam ple:
C orp o ra te Level
N e t in co m e
Cash d iv id en d
D iv id e n d d e d u ctio n
Taxable in co m e
C o rp o ra te tax (3 4 % )
W ith h o ld in g tax (3 1 % )
Sh a reh older L evel
Cash d iv id en d receiv ed
G ross-u p in clu sion
Sh areh older in co m e
Tax b e fo r e cred it
C red it
R efu n dab le cred it
N et Cash to S h areh older
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Credit

Deductions

$ 1 ,0 0 0
660
0
1,0 0 0
340
0

$ 1 ,0 0 0
1,0 0 0
1,0 0 0
0
0
310

$

660
340
1,0 0 0
310
340
(30 )

$

690
310
1,0 0 0
310
310
0

$

690

$

690

Proponents o f the dividends-paid deduction method argue that
(1) it is simpler and easier to administer than the shareholder-credit
system, (2) it handles the debt-equity problem more effectively, and
(3) it can more easily restrict integration benefits to new equity. The
simplicity and ease o f administration o f the dividends-paid deduction
method is its most significant advantage. However, the modifications
(including withholding) required to implement adjustments for for
eign and tax-exempt shareholders, credits, and tax preferences would
complicate this method greatly. Without these modifications, greater
revenue loss, reduced compliance, and a decrease in the value o f tax
preferences could result. Consequently, such a modified deduction
method would provide no significant advantages over a shareholdercredit method.
Another advantage o f the dividends-paid deduction method is
that it would provide for more neutral tax treatment o f debt and
equity. The shareholder-credit method would not achieve the same
result, since the shareholders, not the corporation, would receive the
benefits o f integration. Therefore, under the credit method, corpora
tions may continue to prefer debt because interest would be deducti
ble, whereas dividends would not.
Proponents o f the shareholder-credit method argue that it is
preferable to the dividends-paid deduction method because (1) it
would achieve a higher level o f compliance with less effort, (2) it
would be more flexible in dealing with foreign and tax-exempt share
holders and corporate tax preferences, (3) it would more easily
conform to the integrated systems o f other countries, and (4) it would
not affect the corporation s financial statements.
The shareholder-credit method should have a higher level o f
compliance than the dividends-paid deduction method, unless the
deduction method includes a withholding mechanism. The level o f
compliance would be higher under the credit method because tax
payers would report dividend income before receiving the benefit o f
the credit, whereas under the deduction method, the corporation
would be permitted to take a deduction for dividends even if some
shareholders failed to report the dividend income.
The shareholder-credit method can more easily be designed
either to extend or to limit benefits for foreign and tax-exempt share
holders, and either to pass through or to limit the pass-through o f tax
preferences to shareholders. Although the deduction method, too,
can be designed to address these issues, the credit system would
handle them with far less complexity. A special provision for corpo
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rate tax preferences would make both methods more complex, but
implementation o f rules relating to tax preferences would be more
difficult under the dividends-paid deduction method.
If policymakers decide not to extend integration benefits to taxexempt shareholders, the shareholder-credit method could make the
credit nonrefundable to tax-exempt organizations, whereas the
dividends-paid deduction method would have to tax dividends as
unrelated trade or business income (or include a withholding mecha
nism) to achieve the same result. Making the credit nonrefundable is
easier to implement, and certainly less complex, than requiring
withholding or taxing dividends as unrelated trade or business
income.
The shareholder-credit method also can be more easily tailored
to other specific types o f shareholders. This feature is especially
important when determining the proper treatment o f foreign share
holders, and may be the reason why other countries have preferred
the shareholder-credit instead of the deduction method.100 Con
versely, the main drawback to the dividends-paid deduction method
is that it would apply to all categories o f shareholders equally. Under
the credit method, the United States could make the credit
nonrefundable to foreign shareholders and extend integration
benefits to foreign shareholders only through bilateral treaty negotia
tions. The only way to prevent the granting o f integration benefits to
foreign shareholders under the deduction method would be to
increase the withholding rate on dividends paid to such shareholders.
However, such an increase could be very difficult, if not impossible,
to achieve under the provisions o f many existing tax treaties.
Another advantage o f the shareholder-credit system is that it
would not change the amount o f net income a corporation reports in
its financial statements. Because the corporate income tax liability
would not change under this method, there would be no consistency
problems with reporting the prior year’s operations and cash flows,
such as those that would occur under the deduction method.
International conformity, however, may be the most important
advantage o f the shareholder-credit method. All other major indus
trialized nations that have adopted integration use this method. This
international experience not only would benefit the United States in
designing and implementing an integration system, it also would

100. See Avi-Yonah, “ T h e Treatm ent o f C orp ora te P referen ce Item s U n d er an
In tegrated Tax System; A C om parative Analysis,” 198.
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make it easier to interface the U.S. system with foreign systems.
Adopting the shareholder-credit method also would facilitate
bilateral treaty negotiations on providing reciprocal integration
benefits.
In summary, since both the credit and deduction methods can be
structured to produce substantially equivalent tax results, the United
States should consider other advantages and disadvantages when
selecting the appropriate method. The single most important factor
in this decision seems to be the international ramifications, particu
larly the method's ability to work within the framework o f bilateral tax
treaties. Flexibility in treaty negotiations, particularly in dealing with
foreign tax credits and the extension o f integration benefits to foreign
shareholders, would give the credit system a decisive advantage.
The shareholder credit also would allow for greater flexibility in
handling the key policy issues involved in the treatment o f tax prefer
ences and tax-exempt investors. This flexibility would facilitate the
adoption o f an integrated system, because it would more easily allow
policymakers to reach the compromises that necessarily are a part o f
the legislative process. Although some forms o f the shareholdercredit method may be relatively complicated to implement, inter
national experience suggests that even the most complex forms o f the
method can be administered without substantial difficulty.
On balance, the AICPA concludes that the shareholder-credit
method best achieves the objectives o f an integrated system, and
therefore recommends its adoption by the United States.
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Appendix A

Description of the
Comprehensive
Business Income Tax
T h e C om prehensive Business In co m e Tax (C B IT ) prototype, r e co m 
m en d ed in the Treasury report Integration o f th e Individual and C orporate
Tax System s, w ould virtually elim inate distinctions betw een d eb t and
equity investment, and it w ou ld tax corporate and n oncorporate businesses
alike. U nder CBIT, payments o f interest or dividends w ould not b e d e d u ct
ible by a C B IT entity,* but the payments w ou ld generally b e exclu d ed from
the investor’s incom e. Thus, the in co m e w ou ld b e taxed at the C B IT entity’s
rate and not at the progressive rates applicable to the individual recipients
o f the dividends or interest incom e.
T h e C B IT prototyp e is com preh en sive in that it w ou ld apply to virtu
ally all businesses† w ithout regard to the legal form in w h ich a business
con d u cts its activities. Thus, corporations, S corporations, partnerships,
and sole proprietorships would all b e subject to the same system o f taxation.
Tax p referen ce in co m e w ou ld b e prevented from passing through to
shareholders by means o f an excludable distributions a ccou n t (E D A ). T h e
E D A w ou ld track in co m e that has b e e n fully taxed,‡ and distributions
from the E D A w ou ld b e excludable from the in co m e o f investors. Am ounts
distributed in excess o f the E D A either w ould b e su b ject to a com pen satory
tax at the corporate level or w ould b e taxable to the investors.

* CBIT entity in this context refers not only to corporations and partnerships but also to sole
proprietorships that are subject to CBIT.

† There would be a small business exception for businesses with gross receipts o f less
than $100,000.
‡ The annual addition to the EDA is calculated by the following formula: U.S. tax paid for the
taxable year divided by the corporate tax rate, less U.S. tax paid for the taxable year, plus equity
distributions and interest received from CBIT entities.
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Foreign-source in com e o f the C B IT entity w ould continue to b e subject
to the foreign tax credit. However, such in co m e w ou ld b e treated similarly
to preferen ce in com e, b eca u se foreign-source in co m e that was not su bject
to U.S. tax as a result o f receiving the ben efit o f the foreign tax cred it w ould
not increase the E D A . W ith regard to foreign investors in U.S. CBITs, the
proposal w ou ld elim inate w ithholding on dividends and interest.
T h e C B IT proposal w ou ld not change the taxation o f interest that was
not paid by a C B IT entity. Thus, h om e m ortgage interest and investm ent
interest w ou ld remain deductible.
B ecause all businesses w ou ld b e su bject to the same system o f taxation,
the reorganization provisions fou n d in subchapter C w ou ld have to b e
extended to partnerships and sole proprietorships in order to provide for the
carryover o f E D A 's w hen entities are com bined. Distributions o f appreciated
property by partnerships and sole proprietorships would likely trigger entitylevel taxable in com e and an increase in basis. Alternatively, som e provisions
may b e m ade for carryover basis with regard to such distributions.
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Appendix B

The Effect of
Corporate Distribution Levels
on Effective Tax Rates
Under Current Law and
Alternative Tax
Integration Methods
This appendix sets forth a com parison o f the tax e ffect on corp orate dis
tribution levels u nder the current tax system and u nder three alternative
integration m eth od s — the flow -throu gh m eth od , the d iv iden d s-p a id
d ed u ction m ethod, and the sh areholder-credit m ethod . T h e calculations
reflect the current individual and corporate tax rate structure (31 p ercen t
and 34 p ercen t, respectively).
In the current double-tax environm ent, effective tax rates on dis
tributed in com e d e p e n d on the com bination o f corporate and individual
tax rates, as well as on the am ount o f in co m e distributed. Assum ing full
retention o f earnings by the corporation, the system levies a tax only at the
corporate level (34 p e rce n t at current rates). T h e c o m b in e d shareholdercorporate tax increases to 4 4 .2 3 p ercen t w h en the corporation distributes
50 p ercen t o f its earnings. W h e n the corporation distributes all o f its
after-tax earnings, the c o m b in e d tax rate increases to 54.46 percen t. This
increase in effective tax rates dem onstrates the current system’s bias
against distributing corp orate earnings.
T h e greatest change in effective tax rates from the current system
w ou ld o c c u r u nder the flow -through m eth od o f integration, b eca u se the
effective tax rate under this m eth od (w hich is analogous to current partner
ship and S corporation taxation) equals the shareholder tax rate irresp ec
tive o f the am ount o f corporate distributions. Distributions d o not affect
the tax rate and therefore w ou ld b e a neutral consideration from a tax-effect
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standpoint, oth er than as a sou rce o f funds wi th w h ich to pay the tax. In
addition, since this m eth od w ou ld tax all in co m e at the shareholder level,
the corporate tax w ou ld b e c o m e unnecessary.
Som ew here betw een the effects o f the double-tax system and the effects
o f the flow -through m eth od o f integration lie the effects o f the dividendspaid d ed u ction and the shareholder-credit m ethods, both o f w h ich result
in the same effective tax rate in m ost situations. U nder the latter tw o
m ethods, the change in effective tax rates d ep en d s on the am ount o f
corporate distributions. T h e greater the level o f distribution, the m ore the
co m b in e d effective tax rate shifts from the corp orate rate to the share
h old er rate. T h e effective tax rate under b oth m ethods equals 34 p ercen t
w h en the corporation retains 100 p ercen t o f its earnings, the same rate as
u nder the current system. A ssum ing the tax cred it can b e used to shelter
tax on in com e oth er than the d ividen d on w h ich the credit is earned, the
co m b in e d effective tax rate gravitates toward the shareholder tax rate in
direct p rop ortion to the level o f distribution under either m ethod
(for example, a 32.5 p ercen t co m b in e d effective tax rate assuming a 50
p ercen t level o f distribution, and a 31 p ercen t c o m b in e d effective tax rate
assuming a 100 p ercen t level o f distribution).
I f the shareholder cred it cannot b e used to offset tax on in co m e other
than the dividen d itself, and the corp orate tax rate exceed s the shareholder
tax rate, the com b in e d effective tax rate w ou ld equal the corporate tax rate,
notwithstanding the level o f distribution. In this case, the dividends-paid
d ed u ction and the shareholder-credit m ethods w ill p ro d u ce different
effective tax rates.
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T a b le B.1
S u m m a ry C o m p a r is o n *

Effective Tax Rates
After-Tax Income
Distribution Percentage
0%

Present
Law

Full
Dividend
Deduction

Full
Shareholder
Credit

FlowThroug
h
Method

34%

34%

34%

31%

50%

4 4 .2 3 %

3 2 .5 %

34 % †

31%

100%

5 4 .4 6 %

31%

34% ‡

31%

* This summary assumes the following:
Corporate tax rate
Shareholder tax rate
Corporate pretax income

31%
31%
$1,000

† Assumes a nonrefundable credit. If shareholder credit is allowed to shelter tax on income
from sources other than the dividend giving rise to credit, the effective tax rate is 32.5%.
‡ Assumes a nonrefundable credit. If shareholder credit is allowed to shelter tax on income
from sources other than the dividend giving rise to credit, the effective tax rate is 31%.
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Table B.2
0% Incom e D istribution
Present
Law

Full
Dividend
Deduction

Full
Shareholder
Credit

FlowThroug
h
Method

1,0 00

1,0 00

1,000

1,0 00

0

0

0

0

C orp o ra te L evel
N et in co m e
D ivid e n d s paid

0

D iv id e n d d e d u ctio n

0

1,0 0 0

1,0 00

1,0 00

Tax (3 4 % )

340

340

340

0

R etain ed earnings

660

660

660

1,0 00

0

0

0

0

Taxable in co m e

0

Individu al L evel
D ivid en d s re ce iv e d

0

G ross-u p
Taxable in co m e

0

0

0

1,0 0 0

Tax b e fo r e cre d it (3 1 % )

0

0

0

310

0

0

0

310

Total Tax W ith
R efu n dab le C red it

340

340

340

310

E ffectiv e Rate W ith
R efu n d ab le C red it

3 4 .0 0 %

3 4 .0 0 %

3 4 .0 0 %

3 1 .0 0 %

0

C red it
Tax after cre d it

Cash F lo w to Individual
W ith R efu n dab le C red it
D ivid en d s pa id
to individual

0

0

0

0

Tax to individual
after credits

0

0

0

310

0

0

0

(31 0)

340

340

340

310

3 4 .0 0 %

3 4 .0 0 %

3 4 .0 0 %

3 1 .0 0 %

Cash F lo w
Total Tax W ith o u t
R efu n dab le C red it
E ffectiv e Rate W ith ou t
R efu n dab le C red it
Cash F lo w to Individual
W ith o u t R efu n dab le C red it
D ivid e n d s p a id
to individual

0

0

0

0

Tax to individual
after cre d it

0

0

0

310

0

0

0

(31 0)

Cash F lo w
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Table B.3
50% Incom e D istribution
Present
Law

Full
Dividend
Deduction

Full
Shareholder
Credit

FlowThrough
Method

1,0 00

1,000

1,000

1,0 00

330

500

330

500

C orp o ra te L evel
N et in co m e
D ivid e n d s pa id

0

50 0

D iv id e n d d e d u ctio n

0

1,0 0 0

50 0

1,0 00

Tax (3 4 % )

340

170

340

0

Retained earnings

330

330

330

500

330

500

330

500

Taxable in co m e

Individu al L evel
D ivid en d s re ceiv ed

170

G ross-u p
Taxable in co m e

330

500

500

1,0 00

Tax b e fo r e cre d it (3 1 % )

102

155

155

310

170

C red it

0

102

155

(15)

310

Total Tax W ith
R efu n dab le C red it

442

325

32 5

310

E ffectiv e Rate W ith
R efu n dab le C red it

4 4 .2 3 %

3 2 .5 0 %

3 2 .5 0 %

3 1 .0 0 %

D ivid e n d s pa id
to in dividual

330

50 0

330

500

Tax to individual
after credits

102

155

Cash F lo w

228

345

34 5

190

Total Tax W ith o u t
R efu n d ab le C red it

442

325

340

310

4 4 .2 3 %

3 2 .5 0 %

3 4 .0 0 %

3 1 .0 0 %

D ivid en d s pa id
to in dividual

330

50 0

330

500

Tax to in dividual
after credits

102

155

0

310

228

345

330

190

Tax after cred it

Cash F lo w to Individual
W ith R efu n dab le C red it

E ffective Rate W ith ou t
R efu n dab le C red it

(15)

310

Cash F lo w to Individual
W ith o u t R efu n d ab le C red it

Cash F lo w
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Table B.4
100% Incom e D istribution
Present
Law

Full
Dividend
Deduction

Full
Shareholder
Credit

FlowThrough
Method

1,0 00

1,0 00

1,0 00

1,0 00

660

1,0 00

660

1,0 00

C orp o ra te L evel
N et in co m e
D ivid e n d s pa id

1,0 00

D iv id e n d d e d u ctio n
Taxable in co m e
Tax (3 4 % )
Retained earnings

0

1,0 00

0

1,0 00

0

340

0

340

0

0

0

0

0

660

1,0 0 0

660

1,0 00

Individu al L evel
D ivid en d s re ce iv ed

340

G ross-u p
Taxable in co m e

660

1,0 0 0

1,0 00

1,0 00

Tax b e fo r e cre d it (3 1 % )

205

310

310

310

340

C red it

(30 )

0
310

205

310

Total Tax W ith
R efu n dab le C red it

545

310

310

310

E ffectiv e Rate W ith
R efu n d ab le C red it

5 4 .4 6 %

3 1 .0 0 %

3 1 .0 0 %

3 1 .0 0 %

Tax after cre d it

Cash F lo w to Individual
W ith R efu n d ab le C red it
D ivid en d s paid
to in dividual

660

1,0 00

Tax to individual
after credits

205

310

Cash F lo w

445

690

690

690

Total Tax W ith o u t
R efu n dab le C re d it

545

310

340

310

5 4 .4 6 %

3 1 .0 0 %

3 4 .0 0 %

3 1 .0 0 %

E ffe ctiv e Rate W ith ou t
R efu n dab le C red it

660
(30 )

1,0 00
310

Cash F lo w to Individual
W ith o u t R efu n dab le C red it
D ivid e n d s paid
to individual

660

1,0 0 0

660

1,0 00

Tax to in dividual
after credits

205

310

0

310

455

690

660

690

Cash F lo w
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Appendix C

Degree of Reduction of
Economic Double Taxation
in OECD Countries
T h e follow ing sch ed ule was taken from Taxing Profits in a Global
Economy: Domestic and International Issues, p u blish ed by the Organiza
tion o f E co n o m ic C ooperation and D evelop m en t (January 1992), p. 57.

[Table begins on following page.]
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F rance (7)

Turkey (10)
Turkey (10)

Portugal

Italy
N ew Z ealand

G erm an y (3)(9 )

F inland

Australia

F ull cre d it for corp ora te
tax p a id (im putation
system)

Icela n d (4)

N orw ay

G re e c e

Z e ro tax rate on
distribu ted in co m e

Japan

D enm ark

C anada

Austria (8)

Partial cred it for
d om estic
shareholders

Full im putation system
o f full shareholder
r e lie f system

7

Shareholder Level

U nited States

U nited K in gdom

Ireland

6

Corporate Level

Partial
Z e ro rate system
shareholder re lie f
sch em es

5

Elimination o f Econom ic
Double Taxation

Switzerland

Sw eden (6)

N etherlands

Icela n d (4)

Spain (5)

G erm any (3)

Partial cred it for
corporate tax p a id

Partial d ed u ction
o f dividen ds paid

L ow er tax
rule on
distributed
in com e

4

Partial d ividen d
Partial im putation
d ed u ction system system

3

Split rate
system

2

_________ Shareholder Level_________

Reduction o f Economic Double Taxation

_______ Corporate Level_______

L u xem bou rg

B elgium (2)

Classical system (1)

1

None or Very Little
Reduction

Table C.1
Degree of Reduction of
Economic Double Taxation
in OECD Countries
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Source: Taxing Profits in a Global Economy: Domestic and International Issues, Organization o f Economic Cooperation and Development (January 1992), 57.
Reprint permission granted.

10. No personal tax is charged on dividends distributed put of profits which have borne corporation tax which means in practice that the relief is sometimes
partial, sometimes complete. This is why Turkey is shown in both columns 5 and 7.

9. Germany belongs to the extreme right o f the table in over-compensating for the economic double taxation o f dividends by giving both full imputation to
the shareholder and subjecting distributed profits to a lower corporate rate than retained profits. On the other hand, no credit to the shareholder is given for the
payment o f the local business tax.

8. As from 1986 dividends paid to residents are taxed at half the normal rate in the hands of the shareholder. The split rate system (column 2) was abolished as
from 1989.

7. France is sometimes described as having approached elimination rather than mitigation o f the economic double taxation, as shown in the table, because whilst
the rate o f corporation tax has been substantially reduced, the amount o f credit has not changed, but on the other hand, since 1989 retained profits have becom e
subject to a lower rate than distributed profits (currently 34 and 42 percent respectively).

6. The deduction for dividends paid may in some cases result in elimination o f the corporate tax (for dividends on newly issued shares, maximum 10 percent per
year o f the value o f the issue with an overall maximum equal to the total value of the issue).

5. Spain should, strictly speaking, be shown under column 5 as well as column 3, but as the credit to the shareholder is only 10 percent (and much lower than
other countries in column 5) it has been disregarded on de minimis grounds.

4. The deductions for dividends paid may in some cases fully offset the corporate income tax and also the personal income tax, especially for dividends up to 15
percent o f capital value. Dividends exceeding this limit are fully taxed at both levels. Hence, Iceland is classified both under columns 3 and 5.

3. Systems in column nos. 2 and 7 are both operative in Germany.

2. Belgium has moved from a shareholder relief system to a classical system but continues to provide relief to shareholders who invest their dividends in their
own professional activity (the use of a so-called mitigation technique to encourage retentions rather than distribution).

1. In most o f these countries (and in those with reduction at the corporate level) some small degree o f reduction is given to shareholders in the form o f a relatively
low exemption for dividends received.

Appendix D

Characteristics of the
Foreign Tax Systems
for the Countries
Included in the AlCPA Study
T h e follow ing sch ed ule presents the im portant characteristics o f the
corporate tax systems in Canada, Japan, the U nited K ingdom , Italy, France,
Germany, and Australia, A lso in clu d ed in the sch ed ule are the individual
in com e and capital gain tax rates and characteristics o f the integration
system adopted in each country.

[Schedule begins on following page.]
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Note 1

48.25% (BB)

Note 7

Taxation of capital gains

26.35% (Y)
46.40% (Y)

21.25% (BB)

No

Yes

Highest

(C)

Lowest (above tax-free amount)

Individual Incom e Tax Rates

Basis indexation

Capital gains combined with
ordinary income or separate
(rate)

Combined

(B)
Taxable

(AA)

Taxable

Taxation of capital gains

Double tax relief for foreignsource income (nonhaven)

Taxable

28.84% (A)

28.84% (A)

Taxable

39%

Tax rate on undistributed
income (ordinary)

Canada (1)

Taxability of interest on debt
of state/local governments

39%

Tax rate on distributed income
(ordinary)

Corporate Income Tax
System Characteristics

Australia (7)

Note 2

56.8%

5%

No

(F)

Taxable

(E)

Taxable

34%

34%

France (2)

Note 3

53%

19%

No

Combined

Taxable

(L)

(K)

50%

36%

Germany (3)

Table D.1
Characteristics of Foreign Tax Systems

Note 4

50%

10%

No

Combined

Taxable

(N)

Taxable

36%

36%

Italy (4)

Note 5

65% (P)

15%

No

Combined

Taxable

(B)

Taxable

51.38%

51.38%

Japan (5)

Note6

40%

25% (W)

Yes

Combined

Taxable

(Q)

Taxable

33% (T)

33% (T)

UK (6)
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Full (CC)

Comments:

Refundable credit
• Domestic shareholder?
• Foreign shareholder?

Dividend relief to individual
shareholder

No
No

Credit

No
No

No

Rebate (DD)

Refundable credit
• Regular corporation with
offsetting expenses or losses?
• Tax-exempt shareholder (e.g.,
pension trust or charity)?
• Foreign shareholder?

39%

Dividend relief to corporate
shareholder

Shareholder
Credit

Rate (credit as percentage o f
grossed-up dividend)

Method of tax integration

Degree o f integration of
redistributed income

Characteristics of
Integration System
Partial (D)

No
No

Credit

No
No

No

Exclusion

16.67%

Shareholder
Credit

Full (G)

(J)

Yes
(I)

Credit (V)

Yes (H)
(I)

No

Credit or 95%
Exclusion (X)

33.33%

Shareholder
Credit

Full

(M)

Yes
No (U)

Credit

No
No

Yes

Credit

36%

Shareholder
Credit

Full

(O)

Yes
No

Credit

No
No

Yes

Credit

36%

Shareholder
Credit

Partial

Yes
No

Credit

Exempt
No

No

Exclusion

6.4% -12.8% (Z)

Shareholder
Credit

Partial

Yes
(S)

Credit

Yes
(S)

(R)

Exclusion

25%

Advance
Corporation
Tax (ACT)

Table D.1

Characteristics of Foreign Tax Systems
(continued)
Notes:
A: The Canadian federal government imposes tax at the rate o f 28 % plus a surtax
o f 3% o f tax. Each o f the provincial governments then levies tax on corporate
income earned in the province, typically at about 15%, giving a combined rate of
about 44% .
B:

Unilateral relief by foreign tax credit; treaty relief by exclusion or rate reduction.

C: Income is combined with ordinary income, but only 75% o f gain is included
in the tax base.
D: At the federal level, the shareholder credit is equal to 16.67% o f dividends
received. When the reduction in provincial tax is taken into account, the total credit
is about 25 % o f the dividend received. The tax credit at the shareholder level does
not, however, fully offset the tax paid by the corporation on the income.
E: 95% o f gross dividend (i.e., net dividend plus tax credit in respect o f foreign
withholding tax) from 10%-or-more-owned affiliates is exempt. Otherwise, foreign
tax credit corresponding to foreign withholding tax only under treaty provisions.
F: Combined (i) for gains from sales of assets held less than two years, (ii) for
recapture o f depreciation, and (iii) for sale o f some securities; separate for gains
from sales o f assets held two years or more. Gains from sales o f assets held for more
than two years are subject to taxation at an 18% rate. As a condition for the favorable
treatment, a reserve must be booked for the after-tax capital gains (82% ). If this
reserve is subsequently distributed, the tax benefit of the reduced rate is recaptured.
G: Dividends are basically paid to shareholders out o f after-tax profits. A tax
credit (avoir fiscal) is attached to the net dividend received by resident share
holders, equal to 50% of that net dividend. However, under treaty provisions, the
avoir fiscal tax credit can be attributed to nonresident shareholders (generally to
individuals or nonparent corporations).
Shareholders are subject to individual or corporate income tax on the gross
dividend (i.e., net dividend plus tax credit). The tax credit can then be offset against
the shareholder's total tax liability.
For corporate shareholders, 95% o f gross dividend received (net dividend plus tax
credit) is exempt where the distributing company is owned 10% or more. This
applies to both French-source and foreign-source dividends.
H: The avoirfiscal tax credit is refundable to pension funds and charitable organi
zations recognized as fulfilling a public interest.
I: Generally, foreign shareholders do not benefit from the avoir fiscal tax credit,
except under treaty provisions. The tax credit can also be refundable under treaty
provisions.
J: Precompte equalization tax is due by the distributing company upon distribu
tion o f income on which corporate tax at 34% has not been levied (e.g., income
from foreign permanent establishments or dividends from affiliates owned 10% or
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more). Precompte tax is equal to the avoir fiscal tax credit. Tax credits attached to
redistributed dividends (i.e., avoir fiscal or tax credits in respect o f foreign with
holding taxes under treaty provisions) can be offset against precompte tax.
K: Limited exemption for certain special-purpose bonds (e.g., low-income
housing bonds). Otherwise taxable.
L: Income received from affiliates owned 10% or more is exempt. Otherwise,
foreign tax credit.
M: Penalty taxes apply on distribution o f exempt income. This funds credit given
to shareholder. Municipal trade tax (average rate approximately 17%, deductible
for computing corporate tax) is not subject to corporate/shareholder tax integra
tion; however, dividends received from 10%-or-more-owned subsidiaries are not
subject to trade tax. Note that the exemption is only granted if the participation o f
10% or more has been held for a period o f at least twelve months before the end
o f the fiscal year.
N: Tax credit and tax deduction o f 60% o f the profits distributed to Italian corpo
rations by related companies that are not resident in Italy and are owned for
an amount not less than 20% o f their capital stock (10% if such foreign companies
are public-listed).
O: Equalization tax at the rate o f 56.25% (36/64) in case of distribution o f income
exempt from corporate income tax. This funds credit given to shareholder. Local
income tax (ILOR) at a rate o f 16.2%, 75% o f which is deductible for corporation
tax (IRPEG), is not subject to corporate/shareholder tax integration. Proposed
legislation introduced in September 1992 would make local income tax nondeduct
ible for corporate tax, effective for calendar year 1992.
P;

Combined national and local tax rate.

Q: Unilateral relief by foreign tax credit, treaty relief by exclusion, rate reduction
or foreign tax credit.
R: A refund o f the credit is generally not available. A special relief is available,
however, if a company is in a loss position and has surplus receipts o f U.K. dividends.
The company “deposits” the loss with the Revenue and the Revenue pays the credit
to the company. When the company pays dividends in the future, ACT is paid,
which effectively repays the tax credit, and the losses are reinstated.
S: Generally not refundable but by treaty may be refunded subject to application
o f withholding tax on refund and underlying dividend. U.S.-U.K. treaty provides
full ACT refund to U.S. individual and less-than-10% corporate shareholders with
15% withholding tax; corporate 10%-or-more shareholders receive ACT refund of
one-half with 5% withholding tax.
T: The normal rate o f corporation tax for companies with profits greater than£1.25
million is 33 % ; however, a special rate, known as the small companies rate, is availa
ble for companies with profits o f less than £250,000. For profits between £250,000
and £1.25 million, a tapering relief applies.

(continued)
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Table D .1

Characteristics of Foreign Tax Systems
(continued)
If a company is part of a group, these limits are proportionately reduced by the num
ber o f group companies. Therefore, when a company is part of a large worldwide
group, the small companies rate will no longer apply.
U: Generally, no. However, a refundable credit is available for foreign shareholders
if (and to the extent that) the German corporation distributes foreign-source
income to its non-German shareholders.
V: A general deduction is applicable to both dividend and interest income. It is
not applicable to dividends received by shareholders holding more than 35 % in the
distributing company. The avoirfiscal credit from dividends that are sheltered from
tax by this deduction remains available for credit.
W: The basic rate of individual taxation is 25% and this rate determines the rate
o f advance corporation tax (ACT). There is a 20% rate applicable to the first £2,000
o f taxable income.
X: The general regime is to tax the gross dividend and give a credit for the avoir
fiscal. In the case o f parent companies, 95 % o f the subsidiary dividend is excluded
from tax, and no avoir fiscal credit is allowed.
Y:

Represents combined federal and typical provincial tax.

Z: The dividend is not grossed up by the amount o f the credit. A dividend credit
equal to 10% and 2.8% o f the dividend received is allowed against the national and
local taxes o f taxpayers with ordinary income o f less than ¥ 10 million. For taxpayers
with ordinary income in excess o f ¥ 10 million, the credits against national and local
taxes are 5% and 1.4%.
AA: Unilateral relief by exemption (in respect o f nonportfolio [holdings exceeding
10 %] dividends received by Australian resident corporations) foreign tax credit,
treaty relief by exclusion or rate reduction.
BB:

Resident rates shown. Nonresident rates range from 29% to 47%.

C C: Relief is by way o f credit to individual shareholder o f corporate tax paid.
Intercorporate dividends are subject to rebate. Dividends paid to nonresidents that
carry franking credits (i.e., dividends that have been paid out o f tax-paid profits and
are declared to be such) are exempt from withholding tax.
DD : Tax rebate is available to public companies regardless o f the franked status
o f the dividend. However, tax rebate is only available in respect o f franked dividends
(dividends paid out o f tax-paid profits) received by private companies from non
group companies. Tax rebate is available in respect o f unfranked dividends paid to
a private company by a group company.

Individual Capital Gains:
Note 1: Canada. Canadian tax rules provide for a cumulative tax exemption for
capital gains up to a lifetime limit o f C$100,000. Since three-quarters of capital gains
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are included in income for tax purposes, the exemption effectively removes tax
liability on C$25,000 o f capital gains.
Note 2: France. Gains from the sale o f land held for two years or less are taxed
at normal income tax rates. Gains from the disposal o f land and buildings held
for more than two years are adjusted for inflation and then reduced by a percentage
for every year o f ownership over two years. Exempt items include capital gains
arising from the sale o f property from a total holding worth less than FF400,000 and
from the sale o f the principal residence. An annual allowance o f FF6,000 is
deducted from gains otherwise chargeable. Gains on the sale o f stock and shares are
taxable at 16% in specific cases.
Note 3: Germany. Long-term gains from the sale o f private assets are generally
not taxable. Gains realized on business assets and short-term gains from privately
held securities sold within six months o f acquisition and from the sale o f real
property within two years o f acquisition are subject to tax at normal rates. Gains
from the sale o f securities and real property not exceeding DM1,000 in a tax year are
exempt; losses may be set off against gains arising in the same year but cannot be
carried forward or back. For individuals, capital gains from the disposal o f shares in
a corporation by a shareholder o f 25% or more or from the sale o f a partnership
interest are subject to half the normal income tax rate.
Note 4: Italy. Gains arising from the sale o f assets are generally not taxable for
individuals, except in specific cases provided for by the fiscal law, in which case the
gain is taxable as ordinary income (i.e., sales o f immovable property within five years
o f acquisition). An annual election is provided to compute tax on sales o f shares,
quotas, convertible debentures, and option rights either at the rate o f 25% o f actual
net gains or at the rate o f 15% on presumed gains determined by applying specified
indices to the sales proceeds.
Note 5: Japan. Personal capital gains are generally included in taxable income
and taxed at normal rates. The taxpayer may deduct ¥500,000 annually from gains
on the sale o f short-term assets (those held ten years or less). In the case o f long
term assets, half of the gain is taxable. Gains on the sale o f securities are no longer
tax-exempt. Capital gains derived from the transfer o f real property are taxed at
special rates after certain deductions.
Note 6: United Kingdom. Net gains exceeding £5,000 per year (after index relief)
are taxed as income at the individual's marginal rate. Private cars, principal private
residences, government securities held for more than twelve months, and certain
other assets and transactions are exempt. Losses may be carried forward
indefinitely. Nonresidents are not normally subject to capital gains tax.
Note 7; Australia. Gains from the sale o f cars and principal residences are
exempt. Gains are taxed in year o f disposal but may be averaged over five years to
obtain a more favorable tax rate by taking advantage o f individual lower marginal tax
rates in those years (averaging is achieved by dividing the amount o f the capital gain
by five, calculating the amount o f tax on that amount, and multiplying that amount
o f tax by five).
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Table D.1
Characteristics of Foreign Tax Systems
(continued)
Capital losses may only be offset against capital gains, but may be carried forward
indefinitely.
Special rules apply to personal-use assets, including a threshold o f A$5,000 and
limitations on the offset o f losses.
Cost base o f assets used in calculating the gain is indexed for inflation, unless the
asset is held for less than twelve months.
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Appendix E

Comparison of the
Tax Integration Methods
of Foreign Countries
This appendix in clud es a com parison o f the tax integration m ethods
adopted by Canada, Japan, the U nited K ingdom , Italy, France, Germany,
and Australia. A separate calculation has b e e n p erform ed for each country.
T hese calculations show the com b in ed corporate and individual tax burden
under the m ethod o f integration for both a high-rate taxpayer and a low-rate
taxpayer. T hese calculations are based on three different distribution levels.

[Tables begin on following page.]
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Table E.1
Australia
Distribution Level

100%

50%

0%

Pretax Income

100.00

100.00

100.00

Corporate Tax @ 39%

(39.00)

(39.00)

(39.00)

Amount Available for Dividend

61.00

61.00

61.00

Dividend Paid (Net)
Franking Credit

61.00
39.00

30.50
19.50

0.00
0.00

100.00

50.00

0.00

48.25
(39.00)

24.13
(19.50)

0.00
0.00

Gross Dividend
High-Rate Taxpayer
Tax @ 48.25% on gross dividend
Less: franking credit
Net individual tax

9.25

4.63

0.00

Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax

39.00
9.25

39.00
4.63

39.00
0.00

48.25

43.63

39.00

22.25
(39.00)

11.13
(19.50)

0.00
0.00

Net individual tax

0.00

0.00

0.00

Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax

39.00
0.00

39.00
0.00

39.00
0.00

39.00

39.00

39.00

Total tax
Low-Rate Taxpayer (resident)
Tax @ 22.25% on gross dividend
Less: franking credit (See Note)

Total tax

Note: Franking credit can offset tax on any other taxable income derived by the shareholder
in the year.
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Table E.2
Canada
Distribution Level

100%

50%

0%

Pretax Income

100.00

100.00

100.00

Corporate Tax @ 4 4 %

(44.00)

(44.00)

(44.00)

56.00

56.00

56.00

Dividend
Add: gross-up (25% )

56.00
14.00

28.00
7.00

0.00
0.00

Amount subject to tax

70.00

35.00

0.00

Tax before credit (@ 46.4%)
Total dividend tax credit
(federal and provincial)

32.48

16.24

0.00

Amount Available for Dividend
High-Rate Taxpayer

(14.00)

(7.00)

0.00

Net individual tax

18.48

9.24

0.00

Total Tax Burden
Corporate tax
Net individual tax

44.00
18.48

44.00
9.24

44.00
0.00

62.48

53.24

44.00

Dividend
Add: gross-up (25% )

56.00
14.00

28.00
7.00

0.00
0.00

Amount subject to tax

70.00

35.00

0.00

Tax before credit (@ 26.35%)
Total dividend tax credit
(federal and provincial)

18.45

9.22

0.00

(14.00)

(7.00)

0.00

Net individual tax

4.45

2.22

0.00

Total Tax Burden
Corporate tax
Net individual tax

44.00
4.45

44.00
2.22

44.00
0.00

48.45

46.22

44.00

Total tax
Low-Rate Taxpayer

Total tax

Note: Since the provincial tax is a multiple o f the federal tax after dividend tax credit in all
provinces except Quebec, the provincial tax system is effectively integrated, and this schedule
combines federal and typical provincial taxes.
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Table
France
Distribution Level

100%

50%

0%

Pretax Income

100.00

100.00

100.00

Corporate Tax @ 34%

(34.00)

(34.00)

(34.00)

Amount Available for Dividend

66.00

66.00

66.00

Dividend Paid (Net)
Avoir Fiscal

66.00
33.00

33.00
16.50

0.00
0.00

Gross Dividend

99.00

49.50

0.00

56.23
(33.00)

28.12
(16.50)

0.00
0.00

Net individual tax

23.23

11.62

0.00

Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax

34.00
23.23

34.00
11.62

34.00
0.00

57.23

45.62

34.00

Tax at 5% on gross dividend
Less: imputation credit

4.95
(33.00)

2.47
(16.50)

0.00
0.00

Net individual tax (refund)

(28.05)

(14.03)

0.00

34.00
(28.05)

34.00
(14.03)

34.00
0.00

19.92

34.00

High-Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 56.8% on gross dividend
Less: avoir fiscal credit

Total tax
Low-Rate Taxpayer

Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax

5.95

Total tax

92

Table E.4
Germany
Distribution Level

100%

50%

0%

Pretax Income*

100.00

100.00

100.00

Corporate Tax @ 50%
Tax reduction to 36% due to dividend

(50.00)
14.00

(50.00)
6.14

(50.00)
0.00

(36.00)

(43.86)

(50.00)

Amount Available for Dividend

64.00

56.14

50.00

Dividend Paid (Net)
Imputation Credit

64.00
36.00

28.07
15.79

0.00
0.00

100.00

43.86

0.00

53.00
(36.00)

23.25
(15.79)

0.00
0.00

Net corporation tax

Gross Dividend
High-Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 53% on gross dividend
Less; imputation credit
Net individual tax

17.00

7.46

0.00

Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax

36.00
17.00

43.86
7.46

50.00
0.00

53.00

51.32

50.00

Tax at 19% on gross dividend
Less: imputation credit

19.00
(36.00)

8.33
(15.79)

0.00
0.00

Net individual tax (refund)

(17.00)

(7.46)

0.00

36.00
(17.00)

43.86
(7.46)

50.00
0.00

19.00

36.40

50.00

Total tax
Low-Rate Taxpayer

Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax
Total tax

* After municipal trade tax—effective rate averages around 17%.
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Table E.5
Italy
Distribution Level

100%

50%

0%

Pretax Income*

100.00

100.00

100.00

Corporate Tax @ 36% on Taxable
Income o f 104.83

(37.74)

(37.74)

(37.74)

Amount Available for Dividend

62.26

62.26

62.26

Dividend Paid (Net)
Imputation Credit

62.26
35.02

31.13
17.51

0.00
0.00

Gross Dividend

97.28

48.64

0.00

48.64
(35.02)

24.32
(17.51)

0.00
0.00

Net individual tax

13.62

6.81

0.00

Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax

37.74
13.62

37.74
6.81

37.74
0.00

51.36

44.55

37.74

Tax at 10% on gross dividend
Less: imputation credit

9.73
(35.02)

4.86
(17.51)

0.00
0.00

Net individual tax (refund)

(25.29)

(12.65)

0.00

37.74
(25.29)

37.74
(12.65)

37.74
0.00

12.45

25.09

37.74

High-Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 50% on gross dividend
Less: imputation credit

Total tax
Low-Rate Taxpayer

Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax
Total tax

* After local tax at 16.20 % rate. For income earned after January 1 , 1991, only 75% o f the local
tax is deductible. Accordingly, income before local tax o f U9.33 is subject to local tax o f 19.33,
but only 14.50 o f the local tax is deductible for national tax purposes. Proposed legislation
introduced in September 1992 would make local income tax nondeductible for corporate tax,
effective for calendar year 1992.
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Table E.6
Japan
Distribution Level

100%

50%

0%

Pretax Income

100.00

100.00

100.00

National Tax (33.30%)
Inhabitant Tax (6.89%)
Enterprise Tax (11.19%)

(33.30)
(6.89)
(11.19)

(33.30)
(6.89)
(11.19)

(33.30)
(6.89)
(11.19)

Total Tax

(51.38)

(51.38)

(51.38)

48.62

48.62

48.62

Gross dividend

48.62

24.31

0.00

National tax (50% )
Tax credit (5% )

24.31
(2.43)

12.16
(1.22)

0.00
0.00

Net national tax

21.88

10.94

0.00

Inhabitant tax (15%)
Tax credit (1.4%)

7.29
(0.68)

3.65
(0.34)

0.00
0.00

Net inhabitant tax

6.61

3.31

0.00

Net individual tax

28.49

14.25

0.00

Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax

51.38
28.49

51.38
14.25

51.38
0.00

79.87

65.73

51.38

Amount Available for Dividends
High-Rate Taxpayer

Total tax

Note: The capital amount is over ¥100 million.
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Table E.7
United Kingdom
Distribution Level

100%

50%

0%

Pretax Income

100.00

100.00

100.00

Corporate Tax (Before ACT Credit)

(33.00)

(33.00)

(33.00)

67.00

67.00

67.00

Dividend paid (net)

67.00

33.50

0.00

ACT
Gross dividend

22.33
89.33

11.17
44.67

0.00
0.00

33.00
(22.33)

33.00
(11.17)

33.00
0.00

10.67

21.83

33.00

35.73
(22.33)

17.87
(11.17)

0.00
0.00

Net individual tax

13.40

6.70

0.00

Total Tax Burden
ACT
Net corporation tax
Net individual tax

22.33
10.67
13.40

11.17
21.83
6.70

0.00
33.00
0.00

Total tax

46.40

39.70

33.00

22.33
(22.33)

11.17
(11.17)

0.00
0.00

Net individual tax

0.00

0.00

0.00

Total Tax Burden
ACT
Net corporation tax
Net individual tax

22.33
10.67
0.00

11.17
21.83
0.00

0.00
33.00
0.00

Total tax

33.00

33.00

33.00

Amount Available for Dividend

Corporation Tax
Less: ACT credit
Net corporation tax
High-Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 40% on gross dividend
Less: ACT credit

Low-Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 25% on gross dividend
Less: ACT credit

Note: For illustrative purposes, the low-rate taxpayer is assumed to be taxed at the 25% basic
rate o f individual taxation since this is the rate that determines the level o f ACT.
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